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ABSTRACT 
This study addresses a request by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to 
assess the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) administrative surcharge rate and identify 
relevant cost drivers. 
The DSCA operates on a no-profit, no-loss basis and recovers full costs by 
charging a surcharge rate against FMS values.  In 2006, the DSCA increased the rate 
from 2.5% to 3.8% based on an internal Fees Study Group analysis.  While their analysis 
was well-founded, FMS has more than doubled—inflating the trust fund balance and 
raising questions regarding the proper surcharge rate.   
We recommend the DSCA lower its administrative surcharge rate from 3.8% to 
3.0%.  Historical models validate 3.0% as a sufficient rate when applied to actual data 
from 1999 to 2010. Monte Carlo FMS simulations demonstrate that 3.0% minimizes trust 
fund variation, while mitigating the risk of falling below safety levels or accruing an 
excessive balance. 
Using parametric cost-estimating techniques, we tested six cost factors as 
explanatory variables to predict workload and budgets.  Through regression analysis, we 
identified the number of Letters of Request (LORs) completed during the fiscal year as 
the most statistically significant cost driver.  Additionally, the DSCA should monitor the 
rising trends in contractor support and total open cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
In this study, we addressed a request by the director for business operations 
(DBO) at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to assess the foreign 
military sales (FMS) administrative surcharge rate.  The administrative surcharge rate is 
assessed against FMS to recover full costs incurred from administering the program.  The 
DSCA established the current rate of 3.8% based on a 2005 internal analysis known as 
the Fees Study Group.  The purpose of this study is to provide an assessment of the 
DSCA’s cost structure, identify relevant cost drivers of implementing the FMS program, 
review the 2005 Fees Group analysis, and identify the best methodology for determining 
the administrative surcharge rate.   
B. DSCA BACKGROUND 
1. Mission and Organization 
The DSCA is a United States Government (USG) defense agency that operates 
under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), as shown in Figure 1.    
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Figure 1.   Department of Defense Organization Chart (From OSD, 2010) 
The DSCA is established as a separate Department of Defense (DoD) agency 
“under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
and receives policy direction from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic 
Affairs” (Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management [DISAM], 2010, pp. 3–




Figure 2.   Defense Agencies (From OSD, 2008) 
The mission of the DSCA is to “lead, resource, and educate the defense security 
cooperation community to shape, refine, and execute innovative security solutions for 
partners in support of U.S. interests” (DSCA, n.d.a).  In accordance with DoD Directive 
5105.65, the DSCA “shall direct, administer, and provide overall policy guidance for the 
execution of security cooperation and additional DoD programs” (DoD, 2000, p. 2).  The 
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) further describes the DSCA as “the 
DoD focal point for government-to-government arms transfers, budget, legislative, 
projections, forecasting, and other security assistance matters” (DSCA, 2003, p. 45).   
2. Security Assistance Programs 
Security assistance is a group of programs that allows the USG to provide defense 
equipment, training, and services to friendly foreign nations.  For instance, security 




students in U.S. service schools, or advising allied militaries on how to improve internal 
defense capabilities (DSCA, 2003, p. 35).  Joint Publication 1-02 defines security 
assistance as the following: 
A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other 
related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, 
military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, 
or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.  Security 
assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by 
Department of State to be administered by Department of 
Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (DoD, 2001, p. 415) 
The premise behind security assistance is that “if these transfers are essential to 
the security and economic well-being of allied governments and international 
organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic well-being of the 
United States” (DSCA, 2003, p. 35).  According to the SAMM, security assistance 
programs “increase the ability of our friends and allies to deter and defend against 
possible aggression, promote the sharing of common defense burdens, and help foster 
regional stability” (DSCA, 2003, p. 35).  In this way, the United States contributes to its 
own security and prosperity by helping other nations meet their defense and national 
security requirements.   
The major security assistance programs are outlined in Table 1.  Since these 
programs interact with foreign governments, the Department of State (DoS) maintains 
primary responsibility and general oversight of all security assistance programs as 
components of U.S. foreign assistance.  However, the DoS delegates several of these 
programs to the DoD for management and execution.  The DCSA administers the first 
seven programs listed in Table 1 for the DoD, which include the following: FMS; foreign 
military construction services (FMCS); the foreign military financing program (FMFP), 
formerly known as the foreign military sales credit (FMSCR); leases; the military 




Table 1.   Major Types of Security Assistance Programs (From DSCA, 2003, p. 35) 
 
3. Security Assistance Legislation 
Security assistance programs have their foundation in two basic laws: the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).  
Together, the FAA and AECA provide the authority for all DSCA security assistance 
programs.  The FAA serves as the authorizing legislation for a wide variety of foreign 
assistance programs, to include IMET, drawdown, the Economic Support Fund, and 
peacekeeping operations.  The AECA provides the statutory basis for FMS, FMCS, 
FMFP, leases, and Direct Commercial Sales (DISAM, 2010).  Upon signing AECA into 
law, President Gerald Ford stated that “this bill [AECA] recognizes that security 
assistance has been and remains a most important instrument of United States foreign 
policy” (The American Presidency Project, 1976).  Figure 3 illustrates the development 




Figure 3.   Major Security Assistance Authorization Acts  
(From DISAM, 2010, p. 2-2) 
4. Security Cooperation 
Security cooperation is a general term used for defense relationships with foreign 
governments that support U.S. national interests.  Joint Publication 1-02 defines security 
cooperation as the following: 
All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense 
relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied 
and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 
operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency 
access to a host nation. (DoD, 2001, p. 416) 
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen first introduced the term security 
cooperation in his Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) of 1997.  Prior to the DRI, the DSCA 
was known as the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) and primarily managed 
the major security assistance programs authorized by the FAA and the AECA.  The DRI 
proposed that the DSAA assume responsibility for other DoD-funded international 
programs in addition to their traditional security assistance responsibilities.  In 1998, the 
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DSAA was re-designated the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to reflect their larger 
mission beyond security assistance.  With this expansion, the traditional security 
assistance programs became a subset of the broader security cooperation term (DISAM, 
2010, p. 1-1). 
In recent years, the DSCA has assumed management responsibilities for several 
DoD international programs under the umbrella of security cooperation.  The Human 
Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (HDM) programs were “the first DOD-
funded programs to be administered by the DSCA under the new Security Cooperation 
term” (DISAM, 2010, p. 1-14).  Since then, the DSCA has assumed responsibility for 
several other DoD-funded international programs, including the Warsaw Initiatives Fund, 
the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, and the Regional Centers for Security 
Studies (DISAM, 2010, p. 3-12).  Despite the growth of the DSCA’s responsibilities, the 
long-established security assistance programs, namely FMS, remain at the core of 
security cooperation. 
5. The Major Players 
The DSCA is the central agency that synchronizes security cooperation programs 
globally across the OSD, the Joint Staff, the DoS, Congress, geographic combatant 
commands (GCCs), military departments (MILDEPs), security cooperation organizations 
(SCOs), U.S. industry, foreign governments, and international organizations.  The DSCA 
serves as the hub for most DoD security cooperation activities and serves as the DoD’s 
primary interface with the DoS for security assistance programs (DSCA, n.d.d).  Figure 4 
illustrates the various organizations that interface with the DSCA. 
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Figure 4.   DSCA Interface with Organizations (From DSCA, n.d.d) 
The three major USG organizations involved with security cooperation programs 
are Congress, the DoS, and the DoD.  The responsibilities of each of these players are 
described in DoD 5105.38-M:     
(1) Congress “authorizes programs and appropriates funds for the USG-financed 
portions of security assistance… and oversees the sale of defense articles and services to 
foreign countries and international organizations” (DSCA, 2003, p. 45). 
(2) The DoS is “responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction 
of the security assistance program” (DSCA, 2003, p. 45).  This includes determining 
which countries are eligible, determining the size and scope of their program, and issuing 
commercial export licenses for direct commercial sales. 
(3) The DoD “establishes military requirements and implements programs to 
transfer defense articles and services to eligible foreign countries and international 
organizations” (DSCA, 2003, p. 45).  The DoD executes the security assistance programs 




aspects of logistical support.  The DoD also oversees and executes the security 
cooperation programs authorized under Title 10 and provides extensive input on security 
cooperation policy (DSCA, 2003). 
(4) Implementing Agencies. While Congress and the DoS provide direction and 
oversight for security cooperation programs, the three MILDEPs and other implementing 
agencies (IA) actually execute the programs.  MILDEPs and other IAs “prepare and 
execute FMS cases to provide defense articles and services” (DSCA, 2003, p. 46) to our 
foreign partners.  Each of the three major military services manages their own respective 
security assistance organizations.   
• Army. The deputy assistant secretary of the Army for defense exports and 
cooperation (DASA–DE&C) is responsible for the Army’s role in security 
assistance, armaments cooperation, and other programs.  However, the 
Army FMS program is managed separately by the Army security 
assistance command (USASAC).   
• Navy.  The Navy International Programs Office (IPO) has overall 
responsibility for Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard security 
assistance and cooperative programs.  The Naval Inventory Control Point, 
International Programs Directorate (NAVICP–OF) provides initial and 
follow-on logistics support to partner nations.   
• Air Force.  The Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International 
Affairs (SAF/IA) serves as the lead agency for all security cooperation 
programs.  It is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center 
(AFSAC) for most FMS and other logistics functions.   
• Other IAs include the National Security Agency (NSA), the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and 
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA; DISAM, n.d.). 
The DSCA interacts with multiple other parties to foster security cooperation 
programs throughout the world.  This includes coordinating with the GCCs, security 
cooperation organizations (SCOs) and Defense Attaché Offices (DAO).  Security 
cooperation is largely conducted through lateral coordination across various agencies as 
shown in Figure 5 (DISAM, n.d.). While this lateral coordination typically expedites 
program planning and execution, it can also be a source of friction among organizations 
vying for resources.   
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Figure 5.   DSCA Lateral Coordination (From DISAM, n.d.) 
The six GCCs have responsibility for overseeing and executing security 
cooperation programs with foreign nations in their respective areas of responsibility 
(AORs).  GCCs develop theater campaign plans that prioritize security cooperation 
programs to shape their regions.  GCCs typically interact with their foreign partners 
through their assigned SCO (DISAM, n.d.). 
The generic term SCO refers to “all DoD elements, regardless of actual title, 
located in a foreign country to carry out security assistance management functions under 
the FAA and the AECA” (DSCA, 2003, p. 50).  SCOs are normally co-located with the 
America embassy and serve as the primary interface between the foreign governments 
and DoD organizations for security cooperation matters.  SCO functions include 
management and oversight of security assistance programs, general advisory and training 
assistance to the host country, and administrative support (DSCA, 2003, p. 50).  Each 
SCO is headed by a senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT), who is the 
senior DoD representative to the U.S. ambassador and to the foreign government’s 
military (DISAM, n.d.). 
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6. DSCA Directorate 
The DSCA is headquartered in Arlington, VA, and organized into directorates 
headed by principal directors.  These directorates include business operations (DBO), 
information technology (IT), operations (OPS), programs (PGM), strategy (STR), 
DISAM, and the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS).  The DSCA 
also administers five regional centers for security studies that provide education, 
research, and outreach to allied and partnered nations to promote peace and stability 
through security cooperation (DSCA, n.d.f).  Figure 6 outlines the DSCA directorates 
with their underlying divisions and functional areas.  
 
Figure 6.   DSCA Organization Chart (From DSCA, 2010a) 
7. DSCA Trust Fund Management 
The DSCA has three main departments that administer the surcharge rate as well 
as the FMS trust fund.  These departments are comptroller (CMP), financial policy and 
internal operations (FPIO), and strategy (STR).  FPIO is the lead organization in 
determining the administrative surcharge rate as well as managing the health of the FMS 
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trust fund–administrative account (FMS–AA; DSCA, personal communication, January 
5–7, 2011).  In the next section, we describe each organization’s relationship to the FMS 
trust fund. 
a. Comptroller 
The comptroller office is headed by the deputy DBO comptroller (CMP), 
who reports to the DBO.  The mission of this office is multi-faceted; however, it has 
several specific functions that pertain to the administrative surcharge rate.  First, the CMP 
handles the day-to-day accounting of the FMS trust fund, including deposits, 
withdrawals, and transfers.  Secondly, the CMP interfaces with MILDEPs to receive 
program objective memorandums (POMs).  POMs are the mechanism for MILDEP 
funding requests.  A POM includes the following year’s budget request, plus an 
additional three-year budget plan.  MILDEP funding requests are then vetted and 
approved through the DSCA organization.  Finally, the CMP allocates funds to the 
MILDEPs to execute their FMS programs (DSCA, personal communication, January 5–
7, 2011). 
The CMP produces expense data that is used by FPIO to plan FMS trust 
fund projections.  Expense data is driven by MILDEP POM requests and is forecasted out 
two years.  All expense data is calculated by using future budget projections, and 
historical data is not taken into account.  Currently, the CMP only uses POM requests to 
make expense projections and does not employ other metrics, such as utilizing DFAS 
data (DSCA, personal communication, January 5–7, 2011). 
b. Strategy 
The STR office develops FMS forecast data for the FMS trust fund.  Due 
to the unpredictability of FMS, STR can only predict with a degree of certainty two years 
out.  Beyond that, the variability in the data induces large uncertainty in the forecasts.  
Current FMS prediction models utilize linear regression and moving averages (DSCA, 
personal communication, January 5–7, 2011). 
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c. FPIO 
FPIO is the heart of the DSCA for managing the health and well-being of 
the FMS–AA.  FPIO uses POM numbers supplied from the CMP as well as FMS 
forecasts from STR to determine projected FMS-AA health.  Expense models usually 
project for three years while FMS project for two.  In order to project beyond those years, 
FPIO uses models that assume either constant expenses or FMS.  FPIO conducts an 
annual assessment of the administrative surcharge rate by reviewing projected status of 
the FMS-AA (DSCA, personal communication, January 5–7, 2011). 
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II. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF FMS 
A. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
1. FMS Overview  
According to DoD 5105.38-M, FMS is “that part of security assistance authorized 
by the AECA and conducted using formal contracts or agreements between the USG and 
an authorized foreign purchaser” (DSCA, 2003, p. 95). The FMS program brochure 
explains the following:  
Under FMS, the U.S. government procures defense articles and services 
on behalf of the foreign customer.  Countries approved to participate in 
this program may obtain defense articles and services by paying with their 
own national funds or with funds provided through U.S. government-
sponsored assistance programs.  In certain cases, defense articles, services 
and training may be obtained on a grant basis. (DSCA, n.d.c) 
Simply put, the FMS program is “the government-to-government method for 
selling U.S. defense equipment, services, and training” to foreign allies (DSCA, n.d.b).  
FMS is the largest of all U.S. security cooperation programs administered by the DSCA 
and is a fundamental U.S. foreign policy tool.  The stated purpose is that “the FMS 
program supports U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives” (DSCA, 2003, p. 
95).  The program maintains the following:  
Responsible arms sales further national security and foreign policy 
objectives by strengthening bilateral defense relations, supporting 
coalition building, and enhancing interoperability between U.S. forces and 
militaries of friends and allies. These sales also contribute to American 
prosperity by improving the U.S. balance of trade position, sustaining 
highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial base, and extending production 
lines and lowering unit costs for key weapon systems. (DSCA, n.d.b) 
By law, the “FMS program must be administered at no cost to the United States 
Government” (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2009, p. 4).  According to the 
DSCA, “FMS is managed and operated by DoD on a no-profit and no-loss basis.  
Countries and international organizations participating in the program pay for defense 
articles and services at prices that recoup the actual costs incurred by the United States” 
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(DSCA, n.d.e).  The DSCA applies an administrative surcharge to each FMS contract to 
recover the full costs of administering the program.  The administrative surcharge rate is 
currently 3.8% applied to the value of each sale (Baker, 2006).  
In recent years, FMS agreements have reached record levels, topping $38 billion 
dollars in 2009.  The large growth in FMS has raised questions regarding the application 
of the administrative surcharge rate and the allocation and use of funds (GAO, 2009, p. 
16).  Figure 7 shows the 40-year history of total FMS agreements worldwide from 1972 
to 2010.  
 
Figure 7.   Total Worldwide FMS Agreements (1972–2010) (Data from DSCA, 2011) 
Examining foreign military sales as a proportion of total U.S. military spending 
provides a more relevant measure of program growth.  Figure 8 depicts FMS agreements 
as a percentage of the total U.S. defense outlays from 1972 to 2010.  At its peak in 1975, 
FMS agreements represented over 15% of total military spending, but the percentage 
declined rapidly over the next decade, to below 5% throughout the late-1980s.  However, 
in 1993, the share of FMS spiked to nearly 12%.  The increase in FMS agreements from 
1991 to 1993 can be attributed to “new orders for U.S. arms in the Persian Gulf” as a 
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result of “frenetic marketing activity” and the Gulf War (Hartung, 1999, p. 178).  Since 
then, FMS agreements have stabilized to between 2% and 6% of total U.S. military 
defense spending, despite significant growth of actual FMS dollar amounts in recent 
years.    
 
Figure 8.   FMS as a Percentage of U.S. Defense Outlays (1972-2010) (Data from 
DSCA, 2011; Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2010a) 
2. FMS Case Process 
The Management of Security Assistance, published by DISAM, outlines the FMS 
case process in six phases.  The following is a summary description of each phase, with 
selected excerpts taken from both The Management of Security Assistance and the 
SAMM.  
a. Preliminary 
The FMS process begins when “an eligible foreign country or 
international organization requests information on defense articles or services being 
considered for purchase” (DSCA, 2003, p. 125).  The customer identifies a potential 
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defense need to meet its own national security requirements and obtains specific systems 
information from the USG.  Normally, the customer will be engaged in ongoing 
consultations with the in-country SCO or another U.S. representative (DSCA, 2003, p. 
125). 
b. Request 
The customer prepares and submits a letter of request (LOR).  Although 
there is no standard format required for an LOR, the LOR “shall identify the desired 
defense articles and/or services in sufficient detail for the USG to prepare an accurate 
cost estimate” (DSCA, 2003, p. 125).  LORs are routed through the U.S. Embassy to the 
appropriate MILDEP or IA for action.  The “IA is the USG organization authorized to 
receive and process LORs” (DISAM, 2010, p. 5-3).  Figure 9 illustrates the channels of 
request for the LOR.  
 
Figure 9.   Channels of Request (From DISAM, 2010, p. 5-4) 
c. Development of Offer 
This phase begins once the IA receives an LOR from a partner nation and 
ends with a formal offer to the customer through a Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
(LOA).  Upon receipt of the LOR, the IA confirms whether the requestor is eligible.  In 
accordance with the AECA, “defense articles and/or services may be sold or leased to a 
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country or international organization only if the President makes a determination that the 
prospective purchaser is eligible” (DSCA, 2003, p. 95).  Table 2 summarizes the AECA 
criteria for eligibility.   
Table 2.   Presidential Determination Criteria for FMS Eligibility (From DSCA, 2003, 
p. 95) 
 
Once eligibility is validated, the IA acknowledges receipt of the LOR by 
assigning a unique case identifier within 5 days.  Within 10 days, the IA should enter case 
information into the Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS) 
database and provide congressional notification, if required (DISAM, 2010, p. 5–7).  The 
following are the two main response documents to an LOR. 
(1)  Price and Availability (P&A).  A P&A response “is provided 
for country planning purposes only and shows estimated costs and projected availability 
of defense articles or services” (DISAM, 2010, p. 5–6).  It is important to note that a 
P&A does not constitute USG approval or commitment to sell.  The IA should provide a 
P&A response within 45 days after receiving the LOR. 
(2)  Letter of Offer and Acceptance.  The LOA “is the authorized 
document used by the USG as an offer to sell defense articles and services to a foreign 
country of international organization” (DISAM, 2010, p. 5–6).  The IA assigns a case 
manager to each LOA to manage all aspects of the FMS case, including the compilation 
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of LOA data (LOAD) and coordination with program managers.  Concurrent with LOA 
preparation, the DSCA obtains approval from the DoS and prepares a notification 
package for Congress.  After the LOAD is complete, the IA submits the LOA to the 
DSCA Case Writing Division (CWD) for final review and policy compliance.  The CWD 
then countersigns the LOA and returns it to the IA.  Finally, the IA signs and forwards 
the approved LOA to the customer for acceptance.  Although the time required to 
complete an LOA varies with each sale, the general directive is to “provide the customer 
an LOA within 120 days for 80% of all LORs” (DISAM, 2010, p. 5–6). 
d. Acceptance of the Offer 
This phase begins once the IA presents the LOA to the customer and ends 
when the customer officially accepts the offer.  The customer should accept the offer by 
the offer expiration date (OED), as specified on the LOA.  Generally, the OED is 85 
days, which includes 25 days for administrative processing and 60 days for country 
review.  However, there are exceptions to this rule, and countries may request extensions 
or be given a short OED based on USG requirements (DSCA, 2003, p. 162).  The LOA is 
accepted and becomes an official agreement once the customer both signs the LOA and 
provides the initial deposit to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service–Indianapolis 
(DFAS–IN; DSCA, 2003, p. 238).  Once signed, the LOA and its subsequent 
amendments are referred to as an “FMS Case” and become a government-to-government 
agreement between the foreign government and the USG (DSCA, 2003, p. 238). 
e. Implementation and Execution 
The implementation phase begins once the LOA is accepted and should be 
accomplished within 15 days.  Once DFAS–IN receives the initial deposit, they will issue 
obligation authority (OA) to the IA, which allows the case manager to begin case 
implementation.  The IA will issue a case directive that provides detailed instructions and 
information for the FMS case (DISAM, 2010, p. 5–13). 
Case execution is “usually the longest phase of the FMS case life cycle” 
and can take several years (DSCA, 2003, p. 259).  Execution begins “when the IAs start 
the requisition and procurement process against the case directive and does not end until 
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the last article or service is delivered or completed” (DISAM, 2010, p. 5-13).  Case 
execution includes “logistics, acquisition, supply, transportation, maintenance, training, 
financial management, case management, oversight, coordination, case documentation, 
case amendment or modification, case reconciliation and case reporting” (DSCA, 2003, 
p. 259). 
f. Reconciliation and Closure 
This phase marks the final stages of the FMS life cycle. Reconciliation 
refers to the “financial and logistical actions that ensure proper accounting, accuracy, and 
thoroughness of data; currency of schedules; and timeliness and completeness of 
reporting” (DoD, 2004, p. 16).  Reconciliation practices begin at implementation and 
continue as an iterative process throughout the FMS life cycle through closure.  At a 
minimum, case managers should reconcile each case annually.  A case is considered for 
closure once it meets criteria as supply and services complete (SSC).  SSC status is 
achieved once “all materials are delivered, all services performed, all supply discrepancy 
reports resolved, all warranty periods elapsed, and all requirements of the LOA have been 
met” (DISAM, 2010, p. 5–19).  After the case becomes SSC, the IA will submit a 
certificate of case closure to DFAS–IN (DISAM, 2010, p. 5–20).  The FMS case is 
“considered closed when DFAS–IN issues a final bill or a final statement of account to 
the customer” (DISAM, 2010, p. 5–20). 
B. THE FMS TRUST FUND ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT 
The DSCA manages financial resources for the FMS program through the FMS 
trust fund.  The FMS trust fund is divided into two separate accounts: the case 
management account and the FMS-administrative account (FMS-AA).  The case 
management account handles case requirements, with subaccounts tied to specific 
countries and cases.  The FMS–AA, however, is a general deposit account.  Once money 
has been deposited into the FMS–AA, it no longer retains its origins but is available to 
cover expenses for any administrative function.  These expenses include salaries, travel, 
equipment, and rent.  The FMS–AA is similar to a personal savings account: Money is 
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available for use regardless of where the money originally came from.  Figure 10 gives an 
overview of income and expenditures of the FMS trust fund in FY2010 (DSCA, personal 
communication, January 5–7, 2011). 
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Figure 10.   FY2010 FMS Trust Fund Overview (From Baker, 2010a, p. 4) 
There are two main sources of income for the FMS–AA: FMS and non-FMS.  All 
FMS sales are charged a 3.8% administrative surcharge fee, with 50% collected up front 
and the next 50% collected on a case-by-case time line.  Non-FMS cases involve 
domestic orders, the two most common being the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the 
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.  These cases are also charged 3.8%, with 100% of the 
funds collected up front.  While the number of non-FMS cases has grown due to recent 
contingency operations, it remains less than 20% of the total FMS–AA income.  Figure 
11 displays the breakdown of FMS versus non-FMS sales.  This data was supplied by the 
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Figure 11.   FMS Sales Breakdown (From Baker, 2010b, p. 5) 
The FMS–AA has a safety level that is calculated from a criterion set forth in 
DoD 7000.14-R, Volume 15, Chapter 2 (Financial Management Regulation).  The safety 
level is a calculated amount that assumes if all sales were to end, FMS-AA levels ensure 
current cases could be closed out within the next two years.  The current safety level is 
$734 million.  The DSCA aims to ensure a healthy balance that covers current costs plus 
the safety level.  Figure 12 shows the FMS–AA balance from 2000 through 2010 (DSCA, 
























Figure 12.   FMS–AA Balance for 1995-2010 (Data from DSCA, 2011) 
Because of a strong increase in sales from 2005 to 2010, the balance of FMS–AA 
reached a record $2 billion at the close of 2010.  This balance raised interest in an 
organization that operates on a no-profit, no-loss basis (DSCA, personal communication, 
January 5–7, 2011). 
1. History of the FMS Surcharge Rate 
The FMS surcharge rate has changed three times in the past 40 years and is 
reviewed annually by the DSCA.  The DSCA is similar to a working capital fund in that 
both organizations have the goal of breaking even.  The difference between these two 
organizations is that a working capital fund changes their surcharge rates every year 
based on predicted sales and market conditions.  The DSCA has expressed a reluctance to 
change their surcharge rates frequently.  The first reason is that purchasing countries 
prefer the stability of a constant rate, and a changing surcharge rate would disrupt the 




Secondly, because cases last an average of seven years, a constantly changing surcharge 
rate would complicate case management (DSCA, personal communication, January 5–7, 
2011). 
The first significant issue with the FMS–AA came in 1984–1990, when FMS–AA 
balances were negative.  In order to promote expense control, MILDEP budgets were 
reduced by 20% from 1986 through 1987.  In 1987, the logistics support charge (LSC) 
was implemented, bringing in approximately $40 million a year; however, it was strongly 
disliked by customers because the charges were inconsistent.  Finally, in 1990, the Fair 
Pricing Initiative promoted FMS by charging countries only incremental costs to the DoD 
for U.S. military sales.  A positive by-product of this initiative was savings to the DSCA 
of $60 million a year because the DSCA was no longer responsible for reimbursing 
MILDEPs for military salaries associated with program administration (Military 
Assistance Requirements, 1989). 
These savings, coupled with steady FMS, led to a FMS-AA balance of $540 
million in 1999, an all-time high at that time for the FMS-AA. The DSCA leadership 
made a decision to reduce the administrative surcharge rate to 2.5% in order to reduce the 
balance of the FMS–AA.  This decision was prompted by three factors: the high balance 
of the FMS–AA, a belief that previous cost savings would continue, and an idea that this 
move would generate goodwill in the international community.  While the rate was 
reduced, the predicted savings did not happen.  Budgets to MILDEPs that were supposed 
to be reduced actually increased, business reinvention methods did not produce 
significant savings, and revenue/expense levels were not as positive as predicted 
(Webster, 2005). 
These factors prompted the DSCA to conduct an internal analysis in 2005.  The 
outcome of this study was the decision to raise the administrative surcharge rate to 3.8%.  
The primary driver for this change is shown in Figure 13. 
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Security Cooperation Budget Outlook - "Status Quo" 

























Figure 13.   Predicted Trust Fund Balance From the 2005 Fees Study Group (From 
Baker, 2005a) 
Based on projected revenue and expense levels, the DSCA determined that if no 
action were taken, the FMS–AA would become insolvent in 2009.  The DSCA’s internal 
study focused on the following:  
• Reviewing past case files to understand the relationship between the 
administrative charge and the LSC 
• Analyzing revenues generated by country, case size, MILDEP, and fiscal 
year 
• Using statistical models to predict future revenues 
• Running several what-if scenarios of different solutions to forecast future 
FMS–AA health levels 
The decisions resulting from this study included increasing the surcharge rate to 
3.8%, implementing a standard level of service (SLS), creating a small case management 
line (SCML), and eliminating the LSC.  The SLS gives a guaranteed level of commitment 
and service to each purchasing country and answers the question from a buyer: What am 
I getting for my money?  The DSCA also ended the practice of charging an LSC, which 
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was subsequently covered by the new administrative rate.  The LSC was very unpopular 
with buying countries because the charge was not fixed.  There was also a concern that 
raising the surcharge rate would cause countries not to buy from America because of the 
added expense, but record-setting FMS from 2006 to 2010 disproved this concern 
(DSCA, personal communication, January 5–7, 2011).  Table 3 shows the changes in the 
administrative surcharge rate from 1977 to 2006. We conducted a brief analysis of this 
internal study in Chapter IV.   







2. DSCA Expenses 
A current concern in the DSCA is the lack of transparency of expense data that is 
received from MILDEPs in their yearly POM request.  The 3.8% surcharge rate was 
established to recover the full cost of administering the FMS program, but the problem is 
that actual case administrative costs are not currently verifiable.  After a case has been 
accepted, it is managed by the implementing agencies—primarily at the MILDEP level.  
During the yearly POM request cycle, each MILDEP submits a budget request to cover 
total administrative expenses associated with executing all their respective cases.  
Submitted expenses, however, are not linked to specific cases.  There are no systems that 
track actual costs to individual cases, although attempts have been made in the past 
without success (DSCA, personal communication, January 5–7, 2011). 
In 2001, the director of the DSCA required each MILDEP to use performance- 
based costing on all of their cases, thereby allowing cases to be tracked with associated 
expenses (Davis, 2002/2003).  This program had a short life span since performance-
based costing was too time-consuming for MILDEP implementation.  DSCA current 
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practices rely upon MILDEP POM requests to forecast future expenses (DSCA, personal 
communication, January 5–7, 2011). 
Another issue concerning transparency involves the SCMLs, which are cases that 
generated administrative fees of less than $15,000.  The DSCA’s internal study found 
that it takes a minimum of $15,000 to write, implement, and close an FMS case.  In order 
to encourage buying countries to consolidate smaller cases to minimize the administrative 
workload, the DSCA required a minimum administrative cost of $15,000.  Because each 
case is not linked with specific expense data, it is currently not possible to verify if 
$15,000 is the correct number, or if SCML cases need an adjustment factor (DSCA, 
personal communication, January 5–7, 2011). 
C. THIRD-PARTY REPORTS CONCERNING THE DSCA 
Three major government reports have been published concerning the DSCA in the 
past eleven years, two by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and one by the 
Inspector General (IG) of the DoD.  The earlier GAO report was published in 1999, and 
the more recent GAO and IG reports were published in 2009.  Each report described three 
conclusions that were similar in nature. 
The first conclusion of the reports was that “the Department of Defense does not 
have sufficient information to determine the administrative costs associated with the 
Foreign Military Sales program.  As a result, the Department is unable to use actual cost 
as a basis to determine what charges should be applied to foreign military sales, and does 
not know if the percentage charged to the customer on the dollar value of individual sales 
is appropriately recovering Foreign Military Sales program costs” (GAO, 1999b, p. 3).  
All three reports cited the lack of transparent expense data, suggesting that an appropriate 
administrative surcharge rate is not verifiable. 
The second conclusion was that the “DoD lacks information to oversee the 
program [FMS], in large part due to the fact that FMS data reside in 13 different 
accounting, financial, and case implementation systems” (GAO, 2009, p. 2).  All 
MILDEPs use a different accounting and case management system, which leads to the 
DSCA not being able to track case expenses accurately.  The GAO stated that “to 
 29
improve the administration and oversight of the FMS program, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to better determine 
the administrative costs of implementing the FMS program and develop metrics that 
allow the DSCA to comprehensively assess the performance of the FMS program” 
(GAO, 2009, p. 21). 
Finally, the last conclusion was that the “DSCA improperly collected 
administrative fees on Iraq and Afghanistan cases funding contingency operations.  From 
FY2005 through FY2007, the DSCA collected more than $155 million in administrative 
fees to manage non-FMS cases for the ISSF and the ASFF processed in the FMS Trust 
fund.  It is DSCA policy, based on the DoD FMR, not to collect administrative expenses 
on funds placed in the FMS Trust fund for contingency operations.  Because ISFF and 
ASFF are funding contingency operations, the DSCA should not collect administrative 
fees on these cases” (DoDIG, 2009, p. i).  The DSCA director did not concur with this 
finding, stating that “DSCA met all requirements of the Economy Act, and that DSCA is 
required to collect all the direct and indirect costs of the planned work” (DoDIG, 2009, p. 
i). 
D. DSCA BUSINESS PRACTICES COMPARISON  
While the DSCA’s business model is uncommon, the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) shares qualities in their operations that are similar to the DSCA.  
Below is a brief comparison of the PBGC to the DSCA.   
Congress established the PBGC by passing the 1974 Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA).  The PBGC was created “to protect the pensions of 
American workers and retirees participating in private-sector defined benefit plans” 
(PBGC, 2010, p. 2).  Today, the PBGB protects approximately 44 million workers and 
retirees by guaranteeing over 29,000 pension plans. 
The PBGC, similar to the DSCA, receives no federal funding from tax revenues.  
All PBGC operations are funded by insurance premiums set by Congress and collected 
from companies, investment income, assets from pension plans trusted by PBGC, and 
investments taken over by PBGC from pension funds of failed companies.  Variable 
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insurance rates are dictated by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and are subject to 
review by Congress (Inklebarger, 2011).  The past five years has seen rates vary from 
4.80% to 6.32%, depending on the type of insurance and plan (PBGC, 2011). 
Currently, the PBGC is in financial trouble.  It owes $11 billion more over the 
next 10 years than it has in assets, and the Brookings Institute, a Washington D. C. think 
tank, estimates the deficit could balloon to over $100 billion in a worst-case scenario 
(Elliott, 2009). This deficit was created by underfunded pension plans resulting from the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble, which decreased investments in equity securities in 
pension funds.  The recent recession has also severely impacted investment accounts 
through lower equity values and reduced investment income from interest and dividends.  
Demonstrating this, if General Motors and Chrysler had not been rescued from 
bankruptcy, the PBGC would have been required to assume the enormous pension 
liabilities of these companies (“Is the PBGC Next,” 2008). 
The PBGC mimics the DSCA because it was designed by Congress to operate as 
a break-even organization that receives zero tax revenues.  Unlike the DSCA, the PBGC 
receives its operating income from a variety of sources, and not just one administrative 
surcharge.  In addition, PBGC’s income is not differentiated between administrative and 
future funds to be paid out, unlike the DSCA, which separates case-management income 
from administrative income.  Because the PBGC has a continuous stream of income from 
insurance premiums, there is no issue in paying administrative costs along with paying 
out pensions, at least for the short-term. 
The one advantage PBGC has over the DSCA is that it has a very clear picture of 
their cost drivers and future expenses.  PBGC is able to forecast fairly accurately what 
benefits are to be paid out and what future expenses will be, unlike the DSCA.  PBGC 
also has the luxury of setting a variable premium, while the DSCA is required to use a 
fixed surcharge rate.  However, Congress sets maximum caps on what PBGC can charge 
for premiums, which is one cause of their long-term shortfall.  While similar in nature, no 
unique aspects of PBGC’s business operations can be used by the DSCA to manage their 
trust fund account. 
 31
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. GENERAL APPROACH 
A primary concern for the DSCA DBO is to ensure the health of FMS business 
operations.  The DSCA’s financial solvency is attained by managing the levels in the 
administrative trust fund.  Two basic factors that influence the ebb and flow of the trust 
fund are revenues and expenses. FPIO manages revenues using two levers; the 
administrative surcharge rate and the collections schedule.  Annual revenue is 
approximated by applying the surcharge rate and historical collection experience to 
account for both new FMS and revenue streams from prior-year FMS.  The comptroller 
controls expenses by allocating budget levels annually to the implementing agencies that 
execute the FMS programs.  However, the comptroller accomplishes this task without the 
benefit of actual cost data.     
Our study conducts a financial analysis of the DSCA by addressing the following 
research questions: 
(1)  Cost Structure: What is the general cost structure of the DSCA? 
(2) Cost Drivers: What are the relevant cost drivers of administering the FMS 
program? 
(3) DSCA Fees Study Group: Was the 2005 internal study that established the 
3.8% administrative surcharge rate well founded? 
(4) Administrative Surcharge Rate: What is the optimal administrative surcharge 
rate to ensure a healthy trust fund balance? 
Throughout our analysis, we normalized all dollar values to constant FY2010 
dollars. We used the Joint Inflation Calculator (JIC) from the Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis (NCCA) to adjust for inflation based on the OSD cost element for DoD-wide 
civilian pay (NCAA, 2011).  
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B. COST STRUCTURE ANALYSIS 
Beginning in 2005, the DSCA began implementing an online database to 
synchronize budget data across IAs known as the Enterprise Planner database.  Enterprise 
Planner includes budget execution data from 2005 to the current year, and Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) figures for out-years.  The database organizes budget 
execution data by object classification and work years. We evaluated the cost structure of 
the DSCA by identifying trends in object class expenditures from FY2005 to FY2010.   
Object classes identify the types of goods or services purchased.  OMB Circular 
A-11, Section 83 defines object classes as “categories in a classification system that 
presents obligations by the items or services purchased by the Federal Government” 
(OMB, 2010b).  The five major object classes are presented in Table 4. 








Government organizations record more specific object classes within these five 
major categories. Table 5 lists the object classes recorded by the DSCA and available 



















(23.00) Rent, Communications and Utilities (Total) Object Class Total  
It is important to note that object classes represent “obligations according to their 
initial purpose” (OMB, 2010b) and may not always reflect what was actually purchased 
or the services provided.  However, since object class data in Enterprise Planner is 
continuously updated throughout the year of execution as transfers are made between 
government accounts, we can safely assume that object class data for prior years 
represents actual expenditures, not just obligations.   
C. COST DRIVERS – PARAMETRIC COST-ESTIMATING 
Since the mid-1990s, parametric cost-estimating techniques have been used in 
both government and private industries to “maximize the use of historical data in the 
estimating process, increase estimate realism, and reduce the costs associated with 
proposal preparation, evaluation, and negotiation estimate costs” (ISPA, 2008, p. I-4).  
Parametric cost estimating analyzes historical data to develop cost-estimating 
relationships (CER) that can be used to predict future costs. According to the 
International Society of Parametric Analysts (ISPA) Parametric Estimating Handbook:  
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The basic idea in CER development is to 1) identify one or more 
parameters of a product or project that best explain its cost, 2) find some 
historical data that are representative of the desired cost, and appropriately 
normalize it, and finally, 3) identify one or more mathematical functions 
that “fit” the data and that can be used to estimate future costs based on 
similar plans about future projects. (ISPA, 2008, p. 1–21) 
While parametric cost-estimating is primarily utilized to estimate costs of physical 
systems, these same techniques can be applied to estimate the DSCA’s future budgeting 
requirements.  The advantage of this method is that it is founded on quantifiable data.  A 
primary objective of the DSCA’s budget process is to allocate funds efficiently to each 
implementing agency in order to administer the FMS program.  The DSCA’s entire 
annual operating budget is also called the Annual Funding Program (AFP).  Each year, 
the DSCA replicates the governmental Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution (PPBE) process to establish their annual operating budget.  This budget is then 
used to allocate funds to IAs and other sub-organizations through the AFP.  Historically, 
the allocation of funds to each IA has been based on “past administrative budget outlays 
and perceived needs” (GAO, 1999b, p. 4).  However, with the recent boom in FMS as 
well as increasing costs, allocating funds based on incremental budgeting or perceived 
needs may no longer be a financially viable method. 
While each IA is competing for limited budget resources, the DSCA must 
maintain the long-term health of its business through the efficient allocation of funds.  
The task for the DSCA becomes particularly difficult without actual cost data, which, if 
available, could easily be used to justify appropriate funding levels.  Since the health of 
the administrative trust fund depends on expenses as much as revenues, this part of the 
research aimed to answer the expense question: What drives costs?  Thus, a parametric 
cost-estimating approach is utilized to identify relevant cost drivers and build CERs that 
can help predict the future costs and funding levels for implementing the FMS program.  
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1. Basic Regression Model 
Through regression and trend analysis, this research attempts to evaluate the cost 
structure of administering the FMS program and identify potential cost drivers to predict 
work levels and future budget requirements.  Developing a CER will be valuable to the 
DSCA in two primary areas.  For the comptroller, it will help make future budget 
allocation decisions and verify the budgeting requirements requested by the IAs.  For 
FPIO, it will help forecast future expenses to manage the administrative trust fund and 
ensure the long-term solvency of the DSCA’s business operations. Equation 1 shows the 
basic linear regression equation, which determines the best fit of a line using the least 
squares method by minimizing the sum of the squared errors.   
      (1) 
Ideally, the dependent variable, y, would represent actual costs.  But in the 
absence of actual cost data, we estimated actual costs by using actual budget execution 
data.  Thus, the actual budget execution dollars served as the dependent or output 
variable, y.  β0 is a constant that represents the y-intercept.  The independent variables xi 
will be the various cost drivers or explanatory variables.  The coefficient βi represents the 
slope of the line related to the explanatory variable xi.  Multiple explanatory variables 
will be tested to determine the most statistically significant cost factors that best 
approximate the budget.  
a. Data Collection and Normalization 
The DSCA Comptroller and FPIO provided budget execution and cost 
factor data. The Enterprise Planner database was the source for work year data, while cost 
factor data was retrieved from the Defense Security Assistance Management System 
(DSAMS).  All dollar values were normalized to constant FY2010 dollars.  We used the 
Joint Inflation Calculator (JIC) from the Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) to 
adjust for inflation (NCAA, 2011).  Since the DSCA is primarily a service-oriented 
business, with over 70% of their costs associated with civilian personnel and 
compensation, it is appropriate to use the OSD cost element for DoD-wide civilian pay as 
the basis for inflation adjustment.   
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b. Model Acceptance Criteria 
The standards to determine an acceptable model was based on the 
following statistical factors: F-significance; p-values of the explanatory variables; and R 
squared, followed by testing for multi-collinearity, forecast error analysis, and a 
common-sense review.  More specifically, the acceptance criteria for a model are as 
follows: 
1. Model F-significance < 0.05 
2. P-values of explanatory variables < 0.05 
3. R squared > 0.80 
4. Correlation between explanatory variables < 0.70 
5. Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) < 5% 
F-significance tests the significance of the regression model as a whole.  
An F-significance less than 0.05 states that there is less than a 5% probability that the 
results are by chance—or in other words, a 95% confidence level.  Evaluating the p-
values of explanatory variables applies the same 95% confidence level for each variable.  
When using multiple variables in a regression model, it is possible for individual 
variables within a model to be statistically insignificant (p-values > 0.05), while the 
model as a whole remains significant (F-significance < 0.05). Testing the p-values of 
individual variables, also called the t-test, will refine our model by only including those 
variables that are statistically significant.  The R-square value, also called the coefficient 
of determination, is a measure of the “goodness of fit” of the model.  R-square values can 
range from 0 to 1.0.  An R-square of 1.0 represents a perfect model that explains 100% of 
the variation.  Our R-square threshold of 0.80 represents a model that explains at least 
80% of the variability.  Correlation between two variables is called multi-collinearity.  
High correlation between variables (correlation coefficient, r > 0.70) is undesirable, since 
we prefer independent variables that are not distorted by changes in other variables. 
MAPE is a commonly used metric to test forecast accuracy of a model based on 
percentage error compared to actual data. 
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c. Budget Estimating Relationship (BER) 
Since our models use budget execution data rather than actual cost data, it 
is more appropriate to identify the CER in terms of budgets rather than costs.  Thus we 
will refer to our CER as a Budget Estimating Relationship (BER). We developed three 
BER models to estimate budgets for the DSCA; two models estimate workload and 
budget requirements for the DSCA as a whole, and one model estimates budgets at the 
aggregated MILDEP-level. First, a DSCA Work Years model estimates the DSCA’s total 
operating budget using work years as the primary cost driver. Our second DSCA Cost 
Factor model evaluates six cost factors as explanatory variables that drive work years for 
the DSCA.  The last MILDEP Cost Factor model evaluates six cost factors to estimate 
total budget requirements for the primary IAs—the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.   
2. Work Years Model 
Our DSCA Work Years model validates work years as a measure of workload 
that drives the DSCA’s overall operating budget. A work year (W/Y) describes the 
amount of work for one worker for one year of output.  According to the DSCA, a work 
year expresses the full-time equivalent (FTE) definition for employment.  Civilian full-
time employment is generally equal to 40 hours per week each year, or 2,080 non-
overtime hours annually (Office of Personnel Management, 2008). Therefore, an FTE of 
1.0 equals one full-time worker or one work year.   
Since much of the DSCA’s FMS business is service-related, we hypothesized that 
work years should serve as a reliable predictor for costs.   Understanding the impact of 
work years on fluctuations in FMS will provide insights into the elasticity of the business.  
Both trend analysis and regression will be utilized to evaluate W/Y changes with the 
growth in FMS.  The following work year categories tracked by the DSCA are outlined to 





• Total Work Years 
o Military Total 
 Active Enlisted W/Y 
 Active Enlisted Part-Time W/Y 
 Active Officer W/Y 
 Active Officer Part-Time W/Y 
 Reserve Officer W/Y 
 Reserve Enlisted W/Y 
o Civilian Total 
 Active Civilian W/Y 
 Active Civilian Part-Time W/Y 
o Contractor W/Y 
• Average W/Y Cost 
The hypothesized BER for the DSCA Work Years model is shown in Equation 2: 
    (2) 
This approach evaluates work years as the primary input variable that drives the 
DSCA’s total expenses.  Both single and multiple-variable regressions were utilized to 
develop a BER based on previously stated model acceptance criteria.  A work year 
category will be added to the model that maintains the statistical significance of the 
explanatory variable and the overall model.  
3. Cost Factor Models 
The DSCA identified six cost factors that could potentially drive costs. We 
evaluated these factors as explanatory variables.  The cost factors include the following:  
1. Number of  LORs received during FY (#LOR), 
2. Number of LOAs implemented during FY (#LOA), 
3. Number of total open cases (#TOC), 
4. Dollar-value of admin surcharge collected during FY ($Admin), 
5. Dollar-value of end-of-FY sales ($Sales), and 
6. Dollar-value of total open cases ($TOC). 
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Given the budget execution data and these cost factors, regression analysis was 
conducted to determine statistical significance of these variables as cost drivers.  The six 
cost factors were split into two main categories: quantity variables and dollar-value 
variables.  
a. Quantity Variables (#LOR, #LOA, #TOC) 
The quantity variables attempt to capture any relationship between 
increased quantities of LORs, LOAs, and/or total open cases. The IAs, primarily the 
MILDEPs, receive and process LORs.  For each LOR received, there is work associated 
with generating a response in the form of a P&A report or an LOA.  Generally, the IA 
should respond with a P&A within 45 days or an LOA within 120 days for 80% of all 
LORs.  #LOR captures the changes in costs associated with changes in the number of 
LORs received during a given year.   
#LOA captures the costs associated with changes in the number of LOAs 
implemented.  Although the number of LOAs implemented each year is lower than the 
number of LORs received, there are additional cost considerations for LOAs.  In contrast, 
LORs have relatively fixed response times, whereas LOA implementation leads to case 
execution, which is the longest part of the FMS life cycle, lasting several years.   
#TOC captures the costs associated with managing all the cases each year.  
The cumulative effect of additional open cases may systematically increase the costs 
associated with managing and administering the FMS program each year.  The costs 
associated with open cases are even less clear, since open cases may remain idle for 
several years with very little workload.  DISAM reports have recognized that 
reconciliation and case closure is often a slow process and may last several years.  
b. Dollar-Value Variables ($Admin, $Sales, $TOC) 
The dollar-value variables attempt to capture relationships between the 
dollar values and workload or budget requirements.  $Admin captures the contribution of 
administrative funds that each MILDEP contributes to the trust fund each year.  Since 
$Admin is largely a function of the administrative surcharge rate applied to annual FY 
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sales, there is likely a correlation between $Admin and $Sales.  However, $Admin will 
vary as a proportion of $Sales due to the number of small case management lines 
(SCMLs).  Small cases with low values incur a minimum charge of $15,000 per case to 
cover administrative costs. $Sales captures the total value of FMS contracts accepted 
each year, and $TOC accounts for the total value of all open cases.  The dollar-value 
variables test the notion that higher dollar case values require higher workloads and costs.   
The hypothesized BER for our Cost Factor models is shown in Equation 3: 
       (3) 
We used stepwise backward regression to optimize the model for 
statistical significance.  We omitted explanatory variables with the highest p-values first. 
Regression iterations continued until we arrived at a model that met all our acceptance 
criteria.  Note that this model is likely more relevant for estimating budget requirements 
for the MILDEPs rather than the DSCA as a whole.  Because IAs execute FMS cases, 
these cost factors apply primarily to the three military services—the Army, the Navy, and 
the Air Force.  However, we did evaluate these cost factors for significance in our DSCA 
Cost Factor model for estimating work year requirements.  
D. 2005 FEES STUDY GROUP ANALYSIS 
In 2006, DSCA increased their administrative surcharge rate from 2.5% to 3.8% 
based on an internal study called the Fees Study Group.  The internal study headed by 
FPIO concluded that the trust fund balance would become insolvent by 2009.  In 
actuality, the trust fund balance has reached record levels exceeding 2 billion dollars.  
DSCA requested that we evaluate their 2005 internal study to determine if their analysis 
was well-founded.  We evaluated their analysis by replicating the conditions of the study 
using historical data and power point briefings used by FPIO to justify the rate increase.  
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E. ADMINISTRATIVE SURCHARGE RATE 
One of the primary goals of this thesis is to recommend an administrative 
surcharge rate to the DSCA that will promote the following characteristics: 
1)  Stability in the FMS-A. The DSCA is required by law to operate as a break-
even entity.  This is a balancing act for the DSCA because they need enough money in 
the FMS-AA to cover operating expenses as well as manage internal projects (such as 
upgrading their IT systems), yet they do not want too much money in the FMS-AA 
because it attracts unwanted attention.  At the same time, the DSCA is required to 
maintain minimum funding levels in the FMS-AA for safety reasons. 
2)  Stability in the administrative surcharge rate. The DSCA desires an 
administrative surcharge rate that does not change in order to enhance customer 
satisfaction and simplify internal accounting. 
The current rate of 3.8% is not working ideally because the recent growth in FMS 
from 2006–2010 has increased the FMA-AA to just over $2 billion—a level that is 172% 
higher than the DSCA’s safety level of $734 million.  In order to assess an optimal 
solution for the DSCA’s administrative surcharge, we employed a three-step 
methodology: 
1)  Preliminary Analysis 
2)  Historical Modeling of the FMS-AA 
3)  Simulating the FMS-AA from 2011 to 2015 
Each of these steps will be described in detail below. 
1. Preliminary Analysis 
Four main data categories were used in evaluating the surcharge rate, with all 
dollar amounts represented by fiscal year (FY). 
• FMS: Total FMS recorded by the DSCA, including FMS and non-FMS 
programs.  FMS data used from 1977 to 2010. 
• Revenues: Total amount of money actually collected by the DSCA.  
Revenues data used from 1984 to 2010. 
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• Expenses: Total amount of money expended by the DSCA.  Expense data 
used from 1984 to 2010. 
• FMS-AA level: Value of the FMS-AA at the end of the fiscal year.  FMS-
AA data used from 1984 to 2010. 
Data was gathered from two different sources.  For years prior to 2005, all four 
categories of data were collected from the DSCA’s 2005 internal analysis final report.  
Data from 2006 to 2010 was provided by the DSCA-FPIO.  All data was normalized to 
FY2010 dollars using the joint inflation calculator (January 2010 version), using the 
civilian payroll for all services (OSD cost element). 
Preliminary analysis included reviewing ratios of FMS compared to expenses in 
order to identify some basic cost relationships in the FMS-AA.  While useful, these ratios 
have inaccuracies in them because years in which expenses for a case occur do not 
necessarily match when the FMS for that same case happened.  However, initial ballpark 
surcharge rates could be determined by examining these basic relationships. 
Next, the relationship of administrative surcharge rates affecting FMS-AA 
volatility was examined by reviewing the changes in the year-end balance of the FMS-
AA.  This relationship gave an indication of how past administrative surcharge rates 
affected the FMS-AA.  This analysis is also not exact because the only changing variable 
in this analysis is the administrative surcharge rate.  These numbers do not take into 
account changes in the business structure of the DSCA or the changing role of FMS in 
the world during the years analyzed.  It does, however, give another ballpark indication 
of the success of past rates. 
2. Building the Anticipated Earnings Model 
For this thesis, we developed the anticipated earnings model in order to 
accurately assess how various surcharge rates affect the FMS-AA.  For historical 
analysis, this model is able to determine the status of the FMS-AA in year y by applying a 
hypothetical administrative surcharge rate in year x.  This model can also forecast the 
status of the FMS-AA through 2015 using different FMS and expense models that are 
described in Section 4. 
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a. Defining the Anticipated Earnings Model 
A sample of the anticipated earnings model from the years 1999 to 2010 is 
presented in Table 6. 





$ MILLIONS 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
NORMALIZED (FY10) FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 F04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10
FMS $18,047 $17,127 $18,107 $16,304 $16,269 $16,229 $12,283 $23,577 $25,561 $38,714 $39,031 $31,602
TOTAL ADMIN COLLECTED $386 $367 $387 $349 $348 $347 $263 $767 $831 $1,259 $1,270 $1,028
Net Earnings $442 $412 $404 $382 $370 $368 $312 $584 $660 $908 $1,019 $928
Net Expenses $481 $544 $468 $453 $436 $416 $426 $412 $409 $463 $527 $618
Net Income (Earning‐Expense) ‐$39 ‐$131 ‐$64 ‐$71 ‐$65 ‐$48 ‐$114 $172 $250 $445 $493 $310
New Calculated TF Balance $799 $668 $604 $533 $468 $419 $306 $478 $728 $1,173 $1,666 $1,979
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 SUM
Collections Curve 56.30% 9.40% 2.80% 13.63% 5.18% 3.34% 2.80% 2.10% 1.20% 0.95% 0.58% 0.54% 0.51% 0.44% 99.77%  
Definitions of the major terms from this model are as follows: 
New Admin Surcharge Rate: In the anticipated earnings model, this is 
where variable administrative rates can be entered to change model conditions. 
Discount Factor: An 85.60% discount factor was applied to this model on 
all sales.  Discussion on how this number was derived will be presented later in this 
section. 
FMS: All FMS data used was historical data. 
Total Admin Collected:  Defined by Equation 4. 
Total Admin Collected = 
FMS * New Admin Surcharge Rate * Discount Factor  (4) 
Net Earnings: Equation 5 uses a collections curve (as shown in Table 7) 
in order to project how much money the DSCA is able to collect in a given year.  
Equation 5 assumes one is computing the net earnings for FY2010. 
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Net Earnings = 2010 Total Admin Collected * 56.30% + 2009 Total 
Admin Collected * 9.40% + 2008 Total Admin Collected * 2.8% + … + 1998 Total 
Admin Collected * 0.51% + 1997 Total Admin Collected * 0.44%   (5) 
Net Expenses: All net expense data used was historical data. 
Net Income: Defined by Equation 6. 
Net Income = Net Earnings – Net Expenses    (6) 
New Calculated TF Balance: Defined by Equation 7. 
      New Calculated TF Balance =  
Previous Year TF Balance + Current Year Net Income                (7) 
b. Generating an Accurate Collections Curve 
Currently, the DSCA-FPIO uses a 14-year collections curve that was 
developed during DSCA’s 2005 internal study (see Table 7). 
Table 7.   14-Year Collections Curve Model (Data from DSCA, 2011) 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Percentage 56.30% 9.40% 2.80% 13.63% 5.18% 3.34% 2.80%
Year 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 SUM
Percentage 2.10% 1.20% 0.95% 0.58% 0.54% 0.51% 0.44% 99.77%  
In 2010, the DSCA-STR developed a different collections curve model 
that spans eight years and was derived using 2009 DFAS data (see Table 8). 
Table 8.   8-Year Collections Curve Model (Data from DSCA, 2011) 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 SUM
Percentage 57.93% 18.58% 13.13% 6.91% 2.35% 0.80% 0.27% 0.02% 100.00%  
Since the anticipated earnings can only use one collections curve, we used 
the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) statistic to determine which collections curve was 
more accurate.  MAD assesses the difference between forecasted and actual values.  Each 
fiscal year was analyzed for differences between actual and forecasted values, and we 
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calculated the final MAD score by averaging each year’s score together.  The lowest 
MAD value presents the more accurate model. 
Both collections curves were individually used in the anticipated earnings 
model along with the correct historical administration rates.  Since no other variables 
were changed other than the collections curve, this was a solid technique to assess which 
model was stronger.  Table 9 presents the results of the MAD assessment; because the 
14-year collections curve had a lower MAD score than the 8-year collections curve, the 
14-year model is more accurate and was thus used in this thesis. 
Table 9.   Results of MAD Comparison of 8- and 14-Year Collections Models (Data 
from DSCA, 2011) 
Year Actual Earnings 8YR Forecast Error 14 Year Forecast Error
1984 $751 $827 75 $748 3
1985 $621 $748 128 $719 98
1986 $461 $548 88 $546 85
1987 $563 $466 98 $509 54
1988 $561 $576 15 $643 82
1989 $542 $545 4 $571 30
1990 $771 $634 137 $627 144
1991 $882 $886 4 $881 1
1992 $698 $746 48 $689 9
1993 $853 $1,170 317 $1,102 249
1994 $484 $776 292 $722 238
1995 $874 $595 279 $536 338
1996 $580 $523 57 $621 41
1997 $595 $418 176 $494 101
1998 $500 $372 128 $431 69
1999 $541 $381 161 $442 100
2000 $450 $368 82 $412 38
2001 $400 $380 21 $404 4
2002 $408 $361 47 $382 27
2003 $378 $356 22 $370 7
2004 $363 $351 12 $368 5
2005 $363 $300 63 $312 51
2006 $543 $575 32 $584 41
2007 $718 $695 23 $660 58
2008 $1,003 $1,015 12 $908 95
2009 $1,101 $1,142 40 $1,019 82
2010 $922 $1,075 153 $928 6
MAD 93 76  
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c. Discount Factor 
The DSCA’s internal models for assessing future collections use an 
discount factor of 96.6%.  This discount factor was created using historical precedence 
and is the estimated amount of revenue that the DSCA actually expects to collect.  Per 
this model, for each anticipated $1 of revenue, the DSCA will only see $0.97 of that 
money. 
While building the anticipated earnings model, we initially started by 
using the DSCA’s calculated discount factor; however, in testing the model, we realized 
that outputted model results were not matching expected results, especially when 
inputting the correct historical administration rates.  Through a process of trial and error, 
we determined that inputting a calibration factor of 85.60% caused the anticipated 
earnings model to output results that were expected compared to real-world data.  
d. Non-FMS Case Consideration 
One issue not addressed in the anticipated earnings model is the 
collections difference between FMS versus non-FMS earnings.  The 14-year collections 
curve used in this thesis assumes an approximately 50% collections up front.  Since non-
FMS cases charge a 100% up front administrative fee, the collections schedule is 
different.  This factor was not accounted for in the anticipated earnings model, since non-
FMS cases are usually account for less than 20% of total case dollar values.  As can be 
seen in Section e, this did not affect model validity significantly. 
e. Model Validity 
Because we collected historical data from 1984 to 2010, we initially hoped 
that the anticipated earnings model would provide accurate results from 1984 to the 
present day.  Preliminary testing, however, found inaccurate results in the years from 
1984 to 1999.  Figure 14 demonstrates the output of the model from 1984 to 2010 using 






























Figure 14.   Anticipated Earnings Model Compared to Actual FMS-AA Balance 
(1984–2010) 
As can be seen in Figure 14, from 1984 to 1999, real-world FMS-AA 
balances were 22.7% different from calculated FMS-AA balances using the anticipated 
earnings model.  Based on this result, we elected to use data output from only 1999 
onwards for this model.  From 1999 to 2010, the difference between the anticipated 
earnings model using correct historical administrative rates and actual FMS-AA balances 
was 4.4% per year, which is within an acceptable error threshold. 
Figure 15 presents the validity of the anticipated earnings model from 
1999 to 2010.  The final version of the model used in this thesis begins in 1999, uses an 



























Figure 15.    Anticipated Earnings Model Compared to Actual FMS-AA Balance 
(1999–2010) 
3. Historical Modeling of the FMS-AA 
Once we built the anticipated earnings model, it was possible to create a historical 
model of the FMS-AA that answers the question, If x administrative surcharge rate was 
applied in 1999, the ending balance of the FMS-AA in 2010 was y.  All surcharge rates 
between 2.0 and 4.0% were tested (using a difference of 0.1%).  Our final results in 
Chapter IV present the most significant findings. 
4. Simulating the FMS-AA from 2011 to 2015 
The FMS-AA was forecasted from 2011 to 2015 using five FMS and two expense 
models.  In order to successfully accomplish this task, we set up the anticipated earnings 
model from 1999-2010 by mimicking accurate historical administrative surcharge rates 
and then hardcoded the 2010 ending FMS-AA balance to the correct 2010 historical 
FMS-AA balance.  Correct setup of the model was imperative to ensure accurate 
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simulated earnings and ending FMS-AA balances in 2011 to 2015.  Finally, 2011 to 2015 
FMS and expenses were manually inputted using the following models. 
• Sales Model 1:  Aggressive FMS growth 
• Sales Model 2:  Reduced FMS 
• Sales Model 3:  2010 FMS levels 
• Sales Model 4:  Monte Carlo simulations 
• Expense Model 1:  Cost driver expense model 
• Expense Model 2:  Flat expense model 
a. Aggressive FMS Growth 
The aggressive FMS growth model was based on the DSCA’s most 
optimistic FMS forecasts from 2011 to 2015.  This model was used to show what could 
happen if FMS continues to increase at 2005 to 2010 rates and was developed by the 
DSCA-STR by doing regression analysis on 2005 to 2010 FMS data.  The FMS 
regression equation (Equation 8) is as follows: 
FMS = -1,1955,945 + 5,968.35 * Year    (8) 
Results of this FMS model are shown in Table 10. 
Table 10.   Aggressive Sales Growth Model ($Millions) 
Model FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Aggressive FMS Growth $46,407 $52,375 $58,344 $64,312 $70,280  
b. Reduced FMS 
The goal of the reduced FMS model (see Table 11) was to show what 
would happen to the FMS-AA if FMS reduced back to levels seen in the 1990s and early 
2000s.  To demonstrate this, we focused on the years 1995 to 2005 because those years 
demonstrated a stable FMS level where FMS each year were within 10% of the preceding 
or next year.  We then averaged the FMS of those years together and applied those FMS 
rates from 2011 to 2015. 
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Table 11.   Reduced FMS Model ($Millions) 
Model FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Reduced FMS $15,758 $15,758 $15,758 $15,758 $15,758  
 
c. 2010 FMS Levels 
The goal of the 2010 FMS levels model was to see the effect on the FMS-
AA if FMS rates stayed at 2010 levels.  Since all data within this table is normalized to 
FY2010, the values do not change over time. 
Table 12.   2010 FMS Levels Model ($Millions) 
Model FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
2010 FMS Level $31,758 $31,758 $32,305 $33,049 $33,809  
 
d. Monte Carlo FMS Simulations 
Predicting future FMS levels tends to be more of an art than a science, so 
we devised a way to simulate the most likely future FMS.  Monte Carlo simulations take 
probability distributions of input variables and then apply them over x amount of trials to 
determine the full range of possible outcomes and the probabilities associated with these 
outcomes.  For this thesis, we accomplished Monte Carlo simulations using two different 
probability distributions. 
Probability Distribution 1 
For the first Monte Carlo model, “buckets” that were $2,500 million large 
were used to divide up historical end-of-year FMS.  For example, all yearly FMS of 
$10,000–12,500 million would be in one bucket, FMS from $12,501 to $15,000 million 
in the next, and so on.  Figure 16 shows the results, with the dollar amount representing 
the mid-point of each bucket and the number of occurrences representing how many 
























Figure 16.   Histogram: FMS Since 1972 (Using $2,500 Million Buckets) 
After placing year-end FMS into buckets, probability distributions of 
forecasted FMS were developed using this data.  For example, using the distribution in 
Table 13, we could say that next year, there is a 2.6% chance that FMS will be $11,250 
million. 
Table 13.   Probability Distribution of Year-End FMS Using $2,500 Million Buckets 
(Values in Millions) 
$11,250 $13,750 $16,250 $18,750 $21,250 $23,750 $26,250 $28,750 $31,250 $33,750
2.6% 10.3% 17.9% 10.3% 5.1% 5.1% 15.4% 0.0% 5.1% 2.6%
$36,250 $38,750 $41,250 $43,750 $46,250 $48,750 $51,250 $53,750 $56,250 $58,750
5.1% 7.7% 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 2.6% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0%  
 
Using the probability distributions shown in Table 13, we utilized 
Microsoft Excel to run 200 trials simulating FMS from 2011 to 2015.  Yearly results 
were then averaged together, resulting in the predicted FMS for 2011 to 2015 presented 
in Table 14. 
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Table 14.   Monte Carlo Model 1 
Model FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Monte Carlo (Prob Dist 1) $26,563 $25,600 $27,638 $26,813 $26,725  
 
Probability Distribution 2 
For the second probability distribution, we made the assumption that FMS 
data was normally distributed (similar to a bell curve).  Based on this assumption, we 
were able to run 1,000 trials using a simulation program1.  Inputs to the program were 
FMS Mean and FMS Standard Deviation.  We obtained both values using the Descriptive 
Statistics function in Excel employing FMS since 1972 (See Table 15). 
Table 15.   FMS Mean and Standard Deviation 
FMS Mean FMS Std Dev
$26,342 $11,567  
 
The simulation program provided results for average FMS over 1,000 
trials for each of the five years simulated.  Those results are displayed in Table 16. 
Table 16.   Monte Carlo Model 2 
Model FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Monte Carlo (Prob Dist 2) $26,448 $25,870 $25,547 $26,561 $26,339  
 
Final Monte Carlo Results 
In Probability Distribution 2, we made an important assumption in saying 
that yearly FMS was normally distributed.  We did this based on the “eyeball” test of the 
distribution of FMS over the years.  Validating this assumption is the fact that Probability 
Distribution 1 results are only 1.9% different from Probability Distribution 2 results.  
Because the results were almost exact, Monte Carlo results in Chapter IV are presented as 
one set of data (we elected to use Probability Distribution 2 data to represent Monte 
                                                 
1 The program is called Cost Estimation Monte Carlo Model, version 0.9.2, developed by Arnold 
Buss, 2010, Naval Postgraduate School.  
 53
Carlo).  Using Probability Distribution 2 results also allowed us to conduct a sensitivity 
analysis of the data, which is discussed later. 
Another important result of the Monte Carlo simulations was discovering 
the probability of occurrence of other future FMS models.  Assuming FMS are normally 
distributed, we then know that any FMS within one standard deviation of the mean has a 
68% chance of occurring, such as the Monte Carlo Model.  Because both the Aggressive 
Sales and Reduced Sales models occur within 1–2 standard deviations from the mean, 
both models have approximately 15% chance of occurring. 
e. Cost Driver Expense Model 
For the Cost Driver Expense Model we utilized the DSCA Work Years 
Model to estimate the DSCA’s future budget based on work years. Civilian and 
contractor work years were forecasted using linear regression.  These forecasted work 
years were then used in the budget estimating relationship to predict expenses for 2011 to 
2015.  Forecasted expenses are presented in Table 17. The significant takeaway for this 
model is that expenses increase linearly over a five-year period, independent of FMS 
levels. 
Table 17.   Cost Driver Expense Model 
Model FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Cost Driver Expense Model $681 $754 $826 $899 $972  
 
f. Flat Expense Model 
We based the second expense model on projected FY2011 expenses used 
by the DSCA.  Because the DSCA-FPIO typically uses a flat expense model to make 
FMS-AA projections, we used FY2011 expenses projected over five years.  The biggest 
difference between the flat expense and the cost driver expense models is that costs are 
$381 million less over a total of five years for flat expenses (See Table 18). 
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Table 18.   Flat Expense Model 
Model FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Flat Expense Model $750 $750 $750 $750 $750  
 
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
In the Monte Carlo model, we assumed that all FMS followed a normal 
distribution.  Because of this, we were able to conduct a sensitivity analysis on using 
different administrative surcharge rates.  This sensitivity analysis forecasts the probability 
that an administrative surcharge rate will either exceed or go below a threshold limit by 
2015. 
For example, we could take a sample rate, say 2.5%, and then determine the 
probability that over a five-year period, it would fall below a certain dollar amount (we 
will use $1 billion for this example).  To accomplish this, using the anticipated earnings 
model, you can simulate FMS over five years to find out what FMS are required to leave 
$1 billion as the final balance in the FMS-AA in 2015 (in this case, a total of $93 billion 
in FMS over five years is needed using Flat Expense projections). 
The simulation program used in Probability Distribution 2 gave the FMS Mean 
($130,764 million) and FMS Standard Deviation ($26,226 million) for all five years that 
the simulations were run.  With the knowledge of mean, standard deviation, and required 
FMS, the NormDist function in Excel returns probability of occurrence.  For example, 
$93,000 million FMS and a 2.5% administration rate returns a probability of 7.5% of 
occurrence. 
For the high threshold sensitivity analysis (the probability of exceeding a 
threshold by 2015), the same inputs were used, however in Excel the (1-NormDist) 
function was used instead of NormDist. 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. COST STRUCTURE 
This section of the research provides a financial assessment of the DSCA’s 
general cost structure and budget trends.   
1. Trend Analysis 
We normalized all FMS and expense values to constant FY2010 dollars and 
conducted a time-series trend analysis. Figure 17 illustrates the annual FMS and budget 
for the DSCA from 1977 to 2010. 
 
Figure 17.   DSCA Foreign Military Sales and Budget (FY1977–2010) (Data from 
DSCA, 2011) 
a. FMS Trends 
From 1995 to 2005, annual FMS remained relatively stable with a mean of 
$15.8 billion and a standard deviation of $1.9 billion in constant FY2010 dollars.  We 
will refer to this decade of consistent FMS as the “stable years.”  However, in the last 
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five years, FMS more than doubled—exceeding $39 billion in 2009 and $31.6 billion in 
2010.  We found that much of the DSCA’s prior analysis focused on the years from 1995 
to 2010, which only shows half the picture.  When we consider a longer time series 
extending back to 1977, we find that the recent growth in FMS is not unprecedented.  In 
fact, the average FMS from 1977 to 2010 exceeds $26 billion dollars—$10 billion more 
than the average FMS during the stable years.   While FMS from 1995 to 2005 were 
indeed stable, they also represented a period of historic lows that could better be 
described as the “lean” years. Observing the long term history of FMS supports the 
conjecture that the recent growth in FMS is merely regression to the mean. 
b. Budget Trends 
During the stable years, budget levels were actually decreasing in constant 
dollars.  Along with the recent FMS growth that commenced in 2006, the DSCA’s 
expenses also increased.  Notice that the recent rise in budget levels lagged the FMS 
boom by approximately two years.  In 2006, the DSCA’s total budget was $419.2 million 
compared to $617.9 million in 2010—a 47% increase in four years.  The growth in 
expenses over the last few years has elevated the DSCA’s total budget to pre-1990 
funding levels.  The following cost structure analysis will focus on data from 2005 to 
2010 as the “relevant range” to understand the most recent cost growth.  
2. Object Class Analysis 
The DSCA’s total budget is divided into eleven major object class categories.  
Figure 18 illustrates the DSCA’s budget execution by object class from 2005 to 2010. 
Examining the relative size of each object class paints a clear picture of the DSCA’s 
general cost structure.  Notice the large portion of personnel compensation and 
contractual services compared to the relatively small share of overhead costs such as rent, 
utilities, and equipment.   
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Figure 18.   DSCA Budget Execution by Object Class (FY2005–2010) (Data from 
DSCA, 2010a) 
Figure 19 illustrates the top three object class categories by dollar values, which 
consist of the following: (11.90) total personnel compensation, (12.00) personnel 
benefits, and (25.00) other contractual services.  From 2005 to 2010, these top three 
object classes account for over 90% of the DSCA’s total budget each year.   
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Figure 19.   DSCA Top 3 Object Classes (FY2005–2010) (Data from DSCA, 2010a) 
Object classes (11.90) total personnel compensation and (12.00) personnel 
benefits are both associated with personnel labor costs.  In 2005, these two object classes 
together accounted for 67% of the DSCA’s total budget.  However, Figure 20 shows that 
the DSCA’s personnel costs as a share of the total budget is on a decreasing trend, 
accounting for less than 59% of the total budget in 2010.  Meanwhile, (25.00) other 
contractual services have increased as a percentage of the total budget during those same 
years.  From 2005 to 2010, it appears that the decrease in the percentage of the DSCA’s 
personnel costs has been displaced by the 10% increase in other contractual services.   
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Figure 20.   Top 3 Object Classes—Share of Total Budget (FY2005–2010) (Data from 
DSCA, 2010a) 
Our object class analysis clearly shows that the cost of administering the FMS 
program is due to personnel related and contractor costs – accounting for over 90% of 
their operating expenses each of the last five years.   Thus, the DSCA would be 
characterized as a labor intensive, rather than a capital-intensive organization.   
B. COST DRIVERS 
Using parametric cost-estimating techniques, we modeled DSCA’s budget and 
workload using relevant cost drivers.  Our analysis resulted in the following three 
models:    
• DSCA Work Years Model: uses work years as a cost driver for the 
DSCA’s total operating budget.   
• DSCA Cost Factors Model: uses cost factors to predict future work year 
requirements.   
• MILDEP Cost Factors Model: uses cost factors to estimate MILDEP 
funding levels.    
Cost factors were accepted as relevant cost drivers if they met our criteria for 
statistical significance established in Chapter III: Methodology.   
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1. DSCA Work Years Model 
The DSCA Work Years Model estimates the DSCA’s entire annual operating 
budget.  Since the DSCA’s business is primarily service-related, workload in terms of 
personnel labor is measured by work years.  This model tests the notion that work years 
are a measure of workload, which drives the budget.  Total work years include civilian, 
military, and contractor work years.  Figure 21 depicts work years from 2005 to 2010, 
which demonstrates the predominance of the DSCA’s civilian work force.  In FY2010, 
civilians accounted for 74% of total work years, with contractors accounting for 17% and 
military representing only 9% of total work years.  Since 2005, there has been a 125% 
increase in the share of contractor work years as a percentage of the total.  In addition to 
the growth in contractor support, another trend to note is the rising cost of labor.  Even 
after adjusting for inflation, the average work year cost has increased 12.4% from 2005 to 
2010.  
 
Figure 21.   DSCA Total Work Years (FY2005–2010) (Data from DSCA, 2010a) 
Our DSCA Work Year Model uses work years as a primary cost driver for the 
annual budget.  Note that this model views work years as an input variable rather than an 
output or dependent variable. Table 19 outlines the single-variable regression statistics 
for each work year type, to include average work year cost. Military work years proved to  
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be statistically insignificant as an explanatory variable.  The single variable that provided 
the “best fit” was “work year total,” which produced the highest R-square value of 0.90 
while meeting all our acceptance criteria. 
Table 19.   Single Variable Regression Statistics—DSCA Work Years 
DSCA Work Year Model F Significance F R Square
Work Year Total 36.03223896 0.003876173 0.900080532
Civilian Total 18.48060885 0.012656552 0.822068876
Military Total 6.20344E‐05 0.994092932 1.55084E‐05
Contractors W/Y 23.16415377 0.008567095 0.852747115
Average W/Y Cost 12.75312796 0.023351658 0.761238617  
 
Next, we improved upon the DSCA Work Year model by including more than 
one explanatory variable.  Table 20 provides the regression summary for two model 
variations.  Variation A included all work year components.  While the model’s overall 
R-square value increased to 0.99, military work years remained insignificant as an 
explanatory variable.  Omitting military work years in Variation B maintained the R-
square value while providing statistically significant p-values for both civilian and 
contractor work years.  Incorporating both civilian and contractor work years in a multi-
variable model resulted in a better statistical fit than “total work years” alone, as a single 





Table 20.   Multi-Variable Model Variations—DSCA Work Years 
Model Variation ‐ A p‐values F Significance F R‐square




Model Variation ‐ B p‐values F Significance F R‐square
OMIT: Military W/Y 177.3533934 0.000768053 0.991613243
Civilian Total 0.005870475
Contractors W/Y 0.004406136  
 
Testing for multi-collinearity presented evidence of moderate to strong correlation 
between the two explanatory variables.  Table 21 presents the correlation matrix between 
civilian and contractor work years.  Although the resulting correlation coefficient of 
0.6896 is just below our 0.70 threshold, it is high enough to warrant additional 
consideration.  






To address the adverse effects of multi-collinearity in our model, we added the 
civilian and contractor work years together and treated the sum as a single variable.  
Table 22 presents the regression statistics for our DSCA Work Years model.  Although 
the R-square decreased slightly from 0.9916 to 0.9852 (0.0064 reduction), the F-
significance improved and multi-collinearity was effectively negated.  We prefer this 
model since the benefit of eliminating multi-collinearity outweighs the small reduction in 
the R-square statistic.  Thus, our accepted DSCA Work Years model is a single-variable 
budget estimating relationship that utilizes the sum of civilian and contractor work years 
as the primary cost driver.   
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 33366.16611 33366.16611 265.8417191 8.28117E‐05
Residual 4 502.0455965 125.5113991
Total 5 33868.2117
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95%
Intercept ‐203.637038 41.91862781 ‐4.857912787 0.008291799 ‐320.021807
SUM: Civilian plus Contractor W/Y 0.204186948 0.012523232 16.30465329 8.28117E‐05 0.169416883  
 
Error Analysis 
According to this model, the sum of civilian and contractor work years explains 
98.5% of the variation in the budget from 2005 to 2010, with a standard error of $11.2 
million.  Table 23 presents various measures of forecasting errors for the DSCA Work 
Years model.  The standard error of the estimate (SEE) was calculated by dividing the 
absolute error by the standard error.  The SEE ranged from 0.0568 to 1.4111.  When 
compared to actual data, we find the mean absolute error (MAE) to be $6.8 million and 
the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) to be only 1.57% from 2005 to 2010.  
Hence, the DSCA Work Year Model provides excellent estimates for the DSCA’s annual 
budget. 











2005 $425.68 $440.13 14.4523 3.40% 1.2900
2006 $412.49 $417.73 5.2412 1.27% 0.4678
2007 $409.33 $393.52 15.8088 3.86% 1.4111
2008 $462.66 $462.02 0.6361 0.14% 0.0568
2009 $526.45 $527.28 0.8291 0.16% 0.0740
2010 $617.90 $614.07 3.8349 0.62% 0.3423  
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Budget Estimating Relationship—DSCA Work Year Model 
The budget estimating relationship for the DSCA Work Years model can be 
written as the following: 
 
 (9) 
The use of work years as a predictor for the DSCA’s budget is intuitive since the 
DSCA’s business is largely service-oriented and the majority of expenses are personnel 
costs. It may appear as though using work years as a predictor for the DSCA’s budget is 
self-reinforcing and somewhat trivial.  However, the strong relationship between work 
years and the DSCA’s budget highlights the overwhelming influence that personnel costs 
have in driving the overall budget. For example, the addition of contractor support over 
the last five years has proven to be a statistically significant cost factor, while changes in 
military work years are inconsequential.   
This model validates civilian and contractor work years as cost drivers for the 
DSCA’s annual budget.  The advantages of this model are that it is simple, statistically 
significant, and easily applied.  Applying the budget estimating relationship, DSCA’s 
total budget is predicted to equal $200,000 times the sum of civilian and contractor work 
years less $200 million.  With low demonstrated forecast error, the model can be utilized 
by DSCA to forecast future budgeting requirements based on work years.    
The main limitation of this model is that it applies to the operating environment 
encountered in 2005 to 2010.  If the future operating environment is similar to what 
DSCA experienced in 2005 to 2010, then this model will maintain its relevance.  
However, major changes to economic conditions, personnel structure, or even the 
political environment may distort the estimating relationship.  Additionally, using this 
model to predict future budget requirements is based largely on the ability to accurately 
forecast civilian and contractor work years.  This brings us to the next question: What 
drives civilian and contractor work years?   
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2. DSCA Cost Factor Model 
Our DSCA Cost Factor model evaluates six cost factors as explanatory variables 
to explain civilian and contractor work years from 2005 to 2010.  Note that we are now 
treating the sum of civilian and contractor work years as the output, or dependent 
variable.  First, we developed single-variable models by testing each cost factor 
independently.  Table 24 outlines the single-variable regression statistics for the six cost 
factors.  Using a significance level of 0.05, we found that #LOA, $Admin, and $Sales are 
statistically insignificant. While #TOC and $TOC both have acceptable p-values, their R-
squares fall below our 0.80 threshold. #LOR proved to be the only explanatory variable 
that met all our model acceptance criteria for statistical significance for a single variable, 
with an R-square value of 0.97.   
Table 24.   Single Variable Regression Analysis—DSCA Cost Factor Model 
DSCA Cost Factor Model F F Significance R Square
# LORs Completed During FY 143.7355645 0.000277424 0.972924597
# LOAs Implemented During FY 1.124179085 0.348797395 0.219387158
Total # Open Cases 7.829526199 0.048904742 0.661863042
$ Admin Collected During FY (FY10$) 2.322030607 0.202228738 0.367291896
$ End of FY Sales (FY10$) 0.866885297 0.404524435 0.178119114
$ Total Case Value of Open Cases (FY10$) 14.33088114 0.019341863 0.781788995
 
 
Next, we attempted to improve the model by including more than one variable.  
After numerous regression iterations, no combination of cost factors produced better 
statistical significance than our single-variable model using only #LOR. Thus, the best 
cost driver for civilian and contractor work years is the number of LORs completed 
during the fiscal year (#LOR).  Table 25 presents the regression statistics for our DSCA 
Cost Factor model. 
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 778627.1359 778627.1359 143.7355645 0.000277424
Residual 4 21668.32235 5417.080587
Total 5 800295.4582
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95%
Intercept ‐167.3514093 293.0321004 ‐0.571102651 0.598486062 ‐980.9389501
# LORs Completed During FY 0.480197447 0.040053247 11.98897679 0.000277424 0.368991806  
 
Error Analysis 
According to this model, the number of LORs completed each year explains 
97.3% of the variation in civilian and contractor work years from 2005 to 2010, with a 
standard error of 73.6 work years.  Table 26 presents various forecasting errors for the 
DSCA Cost Factors model.  The SEE ranged from 0.0101 to 1.5371. Compared to actual 
data from 2005 to 2010, our model produced a MAPE of only 1.36%.  Thus, this model 
provides excellent estimates for civilian and contractor work years based on #LOR.   









2005 $3,152.66 $3,068.70 83.9637 2.66% 1.1408
2006 $3,042.97 $3,156.10 113.1301 3.72% 1.5371
2007 $2,924.40 $2,938.09 13.6885 0.47% 0.1860
2008 $3,259.84 $3,219.48 40.3609 1.24% 0.5484
2009 $3,579.41 $3,578.67 0.7448 0.02% 0.0101




Work Year Estimating Relationship—DSCA Cost Factor Model 
The work year estimating relationship for the DSCA Cost Factor Model can be 
written as the following: 
 (10) 
Using the number of LORs as a predictor for work years provides a number of 
insights into the cost of administering FMS cases.  First, #LOR is a quantity variable, 
which indicates that the number of LORs received matter more than the dollar-values. 
Secondly, responses to LORs have prescribed time lines specified in the SAMM, which 
bound the time frames required for the workload.  P&A responses are provided within 45 
days, whereas full LOA responses are normally provided within 120 days for 80% of all 
LORs (DISAM, 2010, p. 5-6). Additionally, this model relies on DSCA’s ability to 
forecast #LORs to estimate future work year requirements.  Figure 22 depicts the #LORs 
completed by the DSCA each year along with the actual civilian and contractor work 
years from 2005 to 2010.  The graph illustrates the parallel between the sum of civilian 
and contractor work years and #LOR as the cost factor.   
 
Figure 22.   Number of LORs and Work Years (FY2005–2010) (Data from DSCA, 
2010a; DSCA, 2011) 
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Our DSCA Cost Factor Model suggests that the number of LORs completed each 
year is the best predictor of workload.  The DSCA’s workload in terms of civilian and 
contractor work years is estimated by taking 48% of #LOR completed each year minus 
163 work years.  The advantages of this model are that it is statistically strong with an R-
square of 0.97, and as a single-variable model—there are no effects of multi-collinearity.  
DSCA can utilize this model to estimate future civilian and contractor work year levels 
based solely on the number of LORs completed each year.   
Like the DSCA Work Years model, the main limitation of the DSCA Cost Factor 
Model is that it applies to the operating environment experienced in 2005 to 2010.  
Additionally, it does not consider input from IAs regarding other factors that drive 
workload and the complexities inherent in implementing each FMS case.  To validate this 
relationship in predicting workload and budgeting requirements, we examined these cost 
factors at the MILDEP level.  
3. MILDEP Cost Factor Model 
The DSCA’s entire annual operating budget is also called the Annual Funding 
Program (AFP).  Each year, the DSCA replicates the governmental PPBE process to 
establish their annual operating budget.  This budget is then used to allocate funds to IAs 
and other sub-organizations through the AFP.  Figure 23 illustrates the share of funds 
allocated to each MILDEP annually. 
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Figure 23.   DSCA Annual Funding Program (FY1995–2010) (Data from DSCA, 
2011) 
In developing our MILDEP Cost Factor Model, we evaluated six cost factors to 
explain MILDEP annual funding allocations.  The output or dependent variable is the 
annual budget allocation to MILDEPs normalized to FY2010 dollars. Using Defense 
Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS) data from 2000 to 2010, we tested 
the explanatory variables for statistical significance.   
Table 27 outlines the single-variable regression statistics for the six cost factors at 
the MILDEP level.  #LOA, #TOC, and $Sales proved to be statistically insignificant.  
$Admin and $TOC both have acceptable F-significance values, but their R-squares fall 
below our 0.80 threshold. #LOR once again proved to be the only single explanatory 
variable that met all our model acceptance criteria for statistical significance, with an R-
square value of 0.91.  
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Table 27.   Single-Variable Regression Analysis—MILDEP Cost Factor Model  
Cost Factor F F Significance R Square
# LORs Completed During FY 96.04463144 4.23157E‐06 0.914322133
# LOAs Implemented During FY 2.784465167 0.129526014 0.236282693
Total # Open Cases 1.399880515 0.267053871 0.134605442
$ Admin Collected During FY (FY10$) 6.932536524 0.02722571 0.435118194
$ End of FY Sales (FY10$) 3.885841207 0.080180253 0.301558986
$ Total Case Value of Open Cases (FY10$) 23.42003705 0.000921759 0.722393901
 
 
Next, we sought to improve upon the MILDEP Cost Factor model by including 
more than one explanatory variable.  Table 28 provides a summary table of the multiple 
regression statistics when all six cost factors are included.  While the model’s overall R-
square value increased to over 0.98, four of the six cost factors proved to be insignificant 
as explanatory variables.   
Table 28.   Multi-Variable Regression Statistics—MILDEP Cost Factor Model 
 
MILDEP Multi‐Variate Regression p‐value F Significance F R‐square






$ Total Case Value of Open Cases (FY10$) 0.18736043  
 
We implemented stepwise backwards regression by omitting the least significant 
variable.  In this case, #LOAs was omitted in the first iteration.  We continued stepwise 
regression until we arrived at a model that met our acceptance criteria for statistical 
significance.  The resulting MILDEP Cost Factor model included #LOR and #TOC as the 
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only two explanatory variables, with an R-square value of 0.96.  Table 29 outlines the 
regression statistics for our MILDEP Cost Factor model.  Note that this multi-variable 
model produces a slightly better statistical “fit” than our single-variable model—
increasing the R-square value to explain 4.5% more variability. 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 27819.54332 13909.77166 93.38417078 2.84634E‐06
Residual 8 1191.617084 148.9521355
Total 10 29011.16041
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95%
Intercept ‐219.1330911 38.34260429 ‐5.715133209 0.000446527 ‐307.5512951
# LORs Completed During FY 0.087673684 0.006919299 12.67089037 1.41483E‐06 0.071717751
Total # Open Cases ‐0.006493715 0.00220318 ‐2.947428733 0.018498271 ‐0.011574257  
 
Testing for multi-collinearity produced a 0.566 correlation coefficient between 
our two explanatory variables.  Table 30 illustrates the correlation matrix for #LOR and 
#TOC.  Though moderate correlation exists between the two variables, the correlation 
coefficient is acceptable as it remains well below our 0.70 threshold.   










Negative Regression Coefficient – Total Number of Open Cases 
While the DSCA Cost Factor model meets all our acceptance criteria for 
statistical significance, the negative regression coefficient for #TOC presents 
inconclusive results. A negative coefficient implies that as the total number of open cases 
increases, budget levels will decrease.  This is counterintuitive, since logically more cases 
should require more workload and more funding.  We examined this phenomenon further 
to better understand the effects of increasing total number of open cases.   
Figure 24 graphically depicts the #LOR and #TOC from 2000 to 2010 for the 
three MILDEPs along with the LORs as a percentage of total open cases.  During the last 
decade, the #LOR completed each year remains relatively stable, with a slight increase in 
recent years.  The arithmetic mean of #LOR from the last decade is 6,637 LORs with a 
standard deviation of 676.  Based on historical trends, we could expect that the #LORs 
will remain somewhere between 6,000 and 8,000 each year. 
 
Figure 24.   MILDEP LORs and Total Number of Open Cases (FY2000–2010) (Data 




Notice that in 2001, the total number of open cases exceeds the #LORs for the 
first time.  This is a notable inflection point, since the total number of open cases will 
continue to surpass #LOR each year.  Examining the share of #LOR to open cases further 
demonstrates this transition.  In 2000, #LORs represented over 124% of the total number 
of open cases.  Over the last decade, the share of #LORs completed each year as a 
proportion of open cases has dropped below 70%.  The cumulative number of open cases 
will almost certainly increase over time—widening the gap between #LORs completed in 
a given year. 
When we consider the number of cases actually implemented each year (#LOA), 
the recent low implementation rates may actually help mitigate the growing number of 
open cases. Figure 25 illustrates the MILDEP totals for the number of LORs completed 
and the number of LOAs implemented from 2000 to 2010.  #LOA implemented has 
remained relatively stable, with a mean of 1,510 LOAs implemented each year and a 
standard deviation of 162.   
 
Figure 25.   MILDEP LORs Completed and LOAs Implemented (FY2000–2010) 
(Data from DSCA, 2011) 
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Figure 26 shows the trends of LOA implementation. Over the last decade, 
implementation has been decreasing in both absolute terms and also as a percentage of 
LORs completed each year.  From 2000 to 2008, the MILDEPs implemented between 
20–30% of LORs completed each year.  However, in the last couple years, the 
implementation rate has fallen below 20% to less than 16% in 2010.  DSCA should 
continue to observe the trends in LORs, LOAs, and total open cases to gauge their future 
case management and workload requirements.  
 
Figure 26.   MILDEP LOA Implementation Trends (FY2000–2010) (Data from 
DSCA, 2011) 
Since the negative coefficient for #TOC is counter-intuitive, we omitted it from 
our MILDEP Cost Factor Model and accept the slight reduction in R-square from 0.96 to 
0.91.  In the end, our final MILDEP model utilizes the same explanatory variable as the 
DSCA Cost Factor model— #LOR.  Table 31 displays the regression statistics for our 
accepted MILDEP Cost Factor Model. 
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df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 26525.54605 26525.54605 96.04463144 4.23157E‐06
Residual 9 2485.614354 276.1793726
Total 10 29011.16041
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95%
Intercept ‐205.1411616 51.80831879 ‐3.959618193 0.003306186 ‐322.3397208
# LORs Completed During FY 0.076134557 0.007768645 9.800236295 4.23157E‐06 0.058560661  
 
Error Analysis 
According to this model, the number of LORs completed each year explains 
91.4% of the variation in MILDEP funding levels from 2000 to 2010, with a standard 
error of $16.6 million.  Table 32 presents various forecasting errors for the MILDEP Cost 
Factors model.  The SEE ranges from 0.1897 to 1.6387.  Compared to actual data from 
2000 to 2010, our model produced a MAPE of 4.53%.  Thus, this model provides very 
good estimates for MILDEP budget allocations based on #LOR.   








2000 $305.62 $285.01 20.6111 6.74% 1.2402
2001 $289.35 $273.29 16.0570 5.55% 0.9662
2002 $284.31 $264.84 19.4719 6.85% 1.1717
2003 $276.67 $270.32 6.3520 2.30% 0.3822
2004 $266.36 $285.62 19.2601 7.23% 1.1589
2005 $265.04 $268.95 3.9104 1.48% 0.2353
2006 $258.92 $286.16 27.2336 10.52% 1.6387
2007 $255.97 $264.69 8.7185 3.41% 0.5246
2008 $306.45 $309.60 3.1520 1.03% 0.1897
2009 $356.17 $365.49 9.3168 2.62% 0.5606
2010 $437.47 $428.37 9.0995 2.08% 0.5475  
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Budget Estimating Relationship—MILDEP Cost Factor Model 
The budget estimating relationship for the MILDEP Cost Factor model can be 
written as follows: 
  (11) 
As seen in the DSCA Cost Factor Model, the MILDEP Cost Factor Model 
demonstrates the significance of #LOR in estimating budget requirements.  The same 
advantages and disadvantages apply to the MILDEP model as to the DSCA model.  This 
model is simple and statistically significant but oversimplifies the complex budget 
allocation process.  It is worth noting that the MILDEP Cost Factor Model utilizes five 
additional years of data ranging from 2000 to 2010.  The fact that nearly doubling the 
sample size of the data range resulted in the same significant explanatory variable adds 
validity to both models and presents a stronger case for #LOR as a relevant cost driver. 
This model may be used by the DSCA to validate the funding levels to the MILDEPs 
based on #LORs. Figure 27 depicts the number of LORs completed and MILDEP 
funding levels from 2000 to 2010. 
 
Figure 27.   MILDEP #LORs and Total Budget (FY2000–2010) (Data from DSCA, 
2011) 
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C. THE DSCA’S 2005 INTERNAL STUDY ANALYSIS 
The DSCA’s conducted their 2005 internal study because of a concern that the 
FMS-AA would become insolvent by 2009 if no action were taken.  The major results of 
this study were the implementation of the 3.8% administrative surcharge rate, the 
elimination of the logistics support charge (LSC), the implementation of standard level of 
service (SLS), and the addition of the small case management line (SCML). 
The decision to convene the internal study was valid, as shown by Figure 28.  
Figure 28 demonstrates the FMS-AA balance using 2010 dollars from 1995 to 1999.  The 
implementation of the 2.5% surcharge rate in 1999 resulted in an average 14.6% decrease 
in the FMS-AA from 1999 to 2005, supporting the case that the FMS-AA would become 
insolvent by 2009. 
 
Figure 28.    DSCA Trust Fund Balance (Data from DSCA, 2011) 
The actions taken by the DSCSA in regard to the LSC, SLS, and SCML were 
justified in that they enhanced the business processes of the DSCA and added value to 
DSCA customers.  The LSC was a constant complaint of buying countries, and the 
guarantee of SLS put the DSCA customer service metrics on par with the business 
practices of corporate America.  The SCML enabled the DSCA to provide proper 
incentives to customers to minimize the number of small cases, thus lightening the 
workload of DSCA staff. 
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Based on the data available today, the 2005 decision to change the surcharge rate 
to 3.8% was not justified.  However, there was no measurable way the DSCA could have 
anticipated the significant rise in FMS from 2005 to 2010.  This FMS increase, coupled 
with the 3.8% administrative rate, nearly quadrupled the DSCA’s original estimates on 
the status of the FMS-AA in 2010. 
The DSCA’s internal study produced four options for final consideration: 
• Raise the administration rate to 3.8% and implement SLS 
• Leave the administration rate at 2.5% and reduce infrastructure costs 
• Raise the administration rate to 4.8% and not implement SLS 
• Raise the administration rate to 3.8% and apply to all future deliveries 
 
The final decision to raise the rate to 3.8% and implement SLS was based in part 
on the data presented in Figure 29, which shows the favorable FMS-AA forecast. 
 
Figure 29.   The DSCA’s Model to Justify 3.8% and Standard Level of Service  
 (From Webster, 2005, p. 81) 
The issue concerning this model comes from the steady rise in the FMS-AA in the 
projected 2009–2011 years.  At the time of the study, this increase in the FMS-AA was 
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seen as a positive because it returned the administrative account to a more desirable level 
in the eyes of the DSCA; however, it did not address that a 3.8% administrative surcharge 
rate would cause the FMS-AA to grow indefinitely.  Because the priority in 2005 was to 
“stop the bleeding” for the FMS-AA, not anticipating the fact that a 3.8% surcharge rate 
would continue to grow the FMS-AA indefinitely was a flaw in the decision-making 
process.  
While that aspect of the decision was suboptimal, the rest of the internal study 
used sound methodology and logical reasoning.  This thesis attempts to expand upon the 
DSCA’s internal study to produce a result for the DSCA that is more optimal than using a 
3.8% surcharge rate.  The one major difference between this study and the DSCA’s study 
is that this thesis normalizes all prior FMS and expense data, while the DSCA’s study did 
not.  This is important, because as the value of a dollar changes due to inflation, 
normalizing data allows for an “apples-to-apples” comparison of funding streams over 
large periods of time. 
D. ADMINISTRATIVE SURCHARGE RATE ANALYSIS 
1. Framing the Optimal Surcharge Rate  
In order to provide a framework for finding the optimal administrative surcharge 
rate, we conducted a preliminary analysis by analyzing FMS ratios and trends in the 
FMS-AA. 
a. Ratios of FMS to Expenses 
The administrative surcharge rate can be examined by doing a comparison 
of FMS and expenses.  From 1984 to 2010, there existed on average per year in the FMS-
AA a 2.6% ratio of FMS to expenses.  This number is useful in seeing that the current 
rate of 3.8% is possibly too high, but a lot of stock cannot be put in 2.6% ratio because it 
simplifies the collections basis that the DSCA currently uses.  The next useful ratio to 
examine is of FMS from 1984 to 2003 compared to expenses from 1984 to 2010.  The 
reason for the seven-year difference in FMS to expenses is that it takes into account the 
average case length of approximately seven years.  Using that supposition, in 2010, all 
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expenses for a case written in 2003 should be complete.  This ratio is 3.2% of FMS to 
expenses.  This ratio also has inaccuracies because it takes into account expenses on FMS 
for the years 2004–2010.  While not ideal, this ratio still provides a useful framework for 
finding an optimal surcharge rate.  These results are summarized in Table 33. 
Table 33.   Sample Ratios of FMS to Expenses (1984–2010) 
Average Per Year Ratio of 
FMS:Expenses (1984-2010)
Ratio of FMS (1984-
2003):Expenses (1984-2010)
2.6% 3.2%  
b. Average Yearly Change for the FMS-AA from 1985 to 2010 
The next step in the preliminary analysis was examining how past changes 
in the administrative surcharge rate affected the volatility of the trust fund. 





2006‐2010 (3.8%) 49.3%  
 
One of the DSCA’s goals is to find an administrative surcharge rate that 
causes minimal volatility on the FMS-AA.  As can be seen in Table 34, the ideal range 
for the surcharge rate is somewhere between 3.8% and 2.5%.  While this range is 
imprecise, this data is helpful in framing what is an optimal surcharge rate.  The data in 
Table 34 shows that 3.8% is too high because it causes an almost 50% increase in trust 
fund balance per year, while at the same time 2.5% causes an annual decrease on average 
of 12%.  Since the goal is to maintain a small growth in the FMS-AA, the answer lies 
somewhere in between these two values. 
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2. Historical Modeling of the FMS-AA from 1999 to 2010 
Using the anticipated earnings model, Figure 30 shows the modeled status of the 
FMS-AA in 2010 by applying different sample rates in 1999.  It answers the question, If I 
had applied administrative rate x in 1999, the status of the account today would be y.  
Modeled values are compared to the actual FMS-AA balance, which is shown as a 
dashed line. 
 
Figure 30.   DSCA Trust Fund Using the Anticipated Earnings Model (1999-2010) 
Figure 30 presents several results that are important.  First, if 3.8% had been 
applied in 1999, the FMS-AA in 2010 would be at just over $3 billion, a $1 billion 
increase over the FMS-AA’s current 2010 status.  This trend clearly shows that a 3.8% 
administrative rate is too high.  During the lower sales years of 1999 to 2005, where 
average sales were $16.3 billion as compared to $31.6 billion average sales from 2006 to 
2010, the FMS-AA increased just under 50% per year using a 3.8% administrative rate.  
Also, if the DSCA had left the rate at 2.5% in 2005, the FMS-AA would not have gone 
insolvent, as originally anticipated.  This, however, is not due to bad planning by the 
DSCA but due to the unanticipated significant sales increase from 2006 to 2010. 
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Table 35 shows the average yearly percent change in the ending balance of the 
trust fund using the anticipated earnings model for two different time periods: the stable 
sales years of 1999 to 2005 and the accelerated sales years of 2006 to 2010.  While not 
conclusive, this table suggests an ideal range between 3.0–3.4% for the administrative 
surcharge rate, because this range minimizes excessive FMS-AA fluctuations over two 
different sales scenarios. 











2.00% ‐45.9% ‐68.5%  
 
E. FMS-AA OUTLOOK FROM SIMULATIONS 
1. Simulated Five-Year Future FMS-AA Models 2011–2015 
Using the anticipated earnings model, it was possible to conduct simulations of 
the FMS-AA through 2015.  These simulations used four FMS and two expense models. 
a. Future FMS Models 
While described in-depth in Chapter III, the following are the different 
scenarios that were modeled. 
(1)  Aggressive FMS Growth: This model used the DSCA’s most 
optimistic sales forecasts.  This model is based on historical precedence and has a less 
than 15% chance of occurring assuming FMS is normally distributed. 
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(2)  Reduced FMS: This model used the average of FMS from 
1995 to 2005.  Similar to the Aggressive FMS Growth model, this model also has a less 
than 15% chance of occurring assuming FMS is normally distributed. 
 (3)  2010 FMS Levels: This model used 2010’s FMS in each of 
the simulated future years. 
 (4)  Monte Carlo Simulations: We developed two Monte Carlo 
models using different implementation methods.  Because both models gave very similar 
results for future simulated FMS, results are presented as one model.  Monte Carlo 
models statistically have a 68% chance of occurrence, assuming FMS distribution is 
normal. 
b. Future Expense Models 
Two models were used to determine future expenses.  The cost driver 
model is based on linear growth in expenses while the flat expense model is currently 
used by the DSCA. 
(1)  Cost Driver Expense Model: These expenses are based on cost 
drivers developed earlier in this thesis.  For our Cost Driver Expense Model, we decided 
to use our DSCA Work Years model to estimate DSCA’s future expenses based on work 
years.  We forecasted future work years by applying linear regression to civilian and 
contractor work year data from 2007 to 2010.  We then calculated future expenses using 
the budget estimating relationship for our DSCA Work Years Model. Figure 31 illustrates 
our forecasted expenses for 2011 to 2015.  Notice that this model represents an 
aggressive expense scenario. 
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Figure 31.   Cost Driver Expense Model – Aggressive Budget Forecast 
(2)  Flat Expense Model: This model uses FY2011 funding levels 
applied every year for the next five years.  This is a more conservative model and 
presumes that costs in constant dollars have peaked and will remain the same for the next 
5 years. The DSCA currently uses static expense models for future projections.  Figure 32 




Figure 32.   Flat Expense Model – Conservative Budget Forecast 
Table 36 summarizes the FMS and Expense Models used in the 
five-year simulations.  See Chapter III for details on how values were derived. 
Table 36.   Five Year Simulation Values for Different FMS and Expense Models 
($Millions) 
Model FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15
Sales
Aggressive FMS Growth $46,407 $52,375 $58,344 $64,312 $70,280
Reduced FMS $15,758 $15,758 $15,758 $15,758 $15,758
2010 FMS Level $31,758 $31,758 $32,305 $33,049 $33,809
Monte Carlo $26,448 $25,870 $25,547 $26,561 $26,339
Expenses
Cost Driver Expense Model $681 $754 $826 $899 $972
Flat Expense Model $750 $750 $750 $750 $750   
 
2. Status of FMS-AA in 2015 
All four future FMS and the two expense models were inputted into the 
anticipated earnings model to produce simulated results of the trust fund balance in 2015.  
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Table 37 shows the status of the FMS-AA in five years using these simulations.  3.0–
3.4% administrative rates are highlighted in yellow because that is the target range based 
on preliminary analysis to find the optimal administrative surcharge rate. 
Table 37.   FMS-AA Ending Balances in 5-Years Based on Different Prediction Methods 
($Millions) 
Expense Model: Cost Drivers
Aggressive FMS 2010 FMS Level Reduced FMS Monte Carlo
2.00% $2,691 $1,174 $147 $787
2.50% $3,570 $1,673 $390 $1,190
2.80% $4,097 $1,973 $535 $1,432
2.90% $4,273 $2,073 $584 $1,512
3.00% $4,449 $2,173 $633 $1,593
3.10% $4,624 $2,272 $681 $1,674
3.20% $4,800 $2,372 $730 $1,754
3.30% $4,976 $2,472 $778 $1,835
3.40% $5,152 $2,572 $827 $1,915
3.80% $5,855 $2,972 $1,021 $2,238
4.00% $6,206 $3,171 $1,118 $2,399
Expense Model: Flat
Aggressive FMS 2010 FMS Level Reduced FMS Monte Carlo
2.00% $3,072 $1,555 $528 $1,169
2.50% $3,951 $2,054 $771 $1,571
2.80% $4,478 $2,354 $917 $1,813
2.90% $4,654 $2,454 $965 $1,894
3.00% $4,830 $2,554 $1,014 $1,974
3.10% $5,006 $2,654 $1,062 $2,055
3.20% $5,181 $2,754 $1,111 $2,135
3.30% $5,357 $2,853 $1,160 $2,216
3.40% $5,533 $2,953 $1,208 $2,297
3.80% $6,236 $3,353 $1,402 $2,619
4.00% $6,587 $3,553 $1,499 $2,780  
 
The results in Table 37 have some data worth noting.  The aggressive FMS model 
causes the FMS-AA to double or triple in size.  While this model only has a 15% chance 
of occurrence, this result is undesirable for the DSCA.  If sales remain at their FY2010 
levels, the FMS-AA could increase upwards of another $1 billion depending on the rate.  
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Lastly, using the Monte Carlo future FMS and the cost driver expense model, the FMS-
AA would reduce to $1.5–2.0 billion using rates of 3.0–3.4%.  Using the flat expense 
model, the same rates would produce a FMS-AA between $2.0–2.3 billion. 
3. FMS-AA Year-By-Year Simulation Results 
The next section describes the year-by-year results of the previous 2011 to 2015 
simulation models.  The Monte Carlo simulation FMS presents probability distributions 
for possible outcomes over multiple iterations (using normally distributed FMS), and 
those results are presented first. 
 



































Figure 34.   Monte Carlo Simulation for FMS-AA Using Flat Expense Model 
Results from the Monte Carlo simulations are quite different, depending on which 
expense model is used.  Using the cost driver expense model, any applied administrative 
rate below 3.8% causes the FMS-AA to decrease by 2015.  This is because the cost driver 
model causes expenses to increase by 42% over five years.  Since FMS stays relatively 
flat year by year using the Monte Carlo simulation, it naturally leads to a decrease in the 
FMS-AA.  Compared to the cost driver expense model, the flat expense model produces a 
more stable FMS-AA from 2011 to 2015.  Administrative rates of 3.0% to 3.4% generate 
very small changes to the FMS-AA.  At a 3.0% administrative rate, the FMS-AA 
decreases by -2% over five years, while a 3.4% administrative rate causes the FMS-AA 
to gain 11% over five years.   



































































































































































































Figure 35.   2011–2015 Year-by-Year Simulations for the FMS-AA 
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4. Sensitivity Analysis of Simulation Data 
The Monte Carlo model has an advantage over the other FMS models because 
Monte Carlo simulations provide probability distributions for possible outcomes.  Table 
38 below uses the results of the Monte Carlo model to estimate the probability that the 
FMS-AA in 2015 will fall below a certain threshold.  For example, applying a 3.0% 
administrative rate and using the cost driver expense model, the probability of being 
below $828 million in five years is 5.56%. 
We chose the threshold value of $734 million because it is the 2010 FMS-AA 
safety level developed by the DSCA, while $828 million is the projected safety level in 
2015.  The $0 and $1,000 threshold values were used because they provide boundaries 
for analysis.  3.0–3.4% are highlighted again based on preliminary analysis.  Chapter III 
has a deeper examination on how these values were derived.  
Table 38.   Monte Carlo Sensitivity Analysis: Chances That the FMS-AA in 2015 Is 
Below a Threshold Value 
Expense Model: Cost Drivers
$(MIL) $0 $734 $828 $1,000
2.0% 0.7% 42.8% 54.2% 73.8%
2.5% 0.2% 12.4% 18.2% 31.3%
2.8% 0.1% 6.0% 8.9% 16.8%
3.0% 0.1% 3.7% 5.6% 10.9%
3.1% 0.0% 3.0% 4.4% 8.6%
3.2% 0.0% 2.4% 3.6% 7.0%
3.3% 0.0% 1.9% 2.9% 5.8%
3.4% 0.0% 1.5% 2.3% 4.8%
3.8% 0.0% 0.7% 1.1% 2.1%
4.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.8% 1.5%
Expense Model: Flat
$(MIL) $0 $734 $828 $1,000
2.0% 0.0% 8.6% 14.1% 29.3%
2.5% 0.0% 1.8% 3.1% 7.5%
2.8% 0.0% 0.8% 1.5% 3.6%
3.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.9% 2.1%
3.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.7% 1.7%
3.2% 0.0% 0.3% 0.5% 1.4%
3.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 1.1%
3.4% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.9%
3.8% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4%
4.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3%  
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Sensitivity Analysis of Monte Carlo results re-affirms earlier findings.  First, a 
surcharge rate of 2.5% or below carries a high risk that the FMS-AA will not meet 2011 
to 2015 designated safety levels, while a rate of 3.8% or higher demonstrates a reduced 
risk of going below safety levels.  As discussed previously, the 3.0–3.4% surcharge range 
appears to meet all desired constraints of low variability with reduced risk.  At the most 
extreme, there is only a 5.6% chance using a 3.0% administrative rate that the FMS-AA 
in 2015 will be below the projected 2015 safety level. 
Table 39 presents sensitivity analysis from a different perspective.  This table 
demonstrates the probability that the FMS-AA in 2015 will surpass a certain threshold 
based on a given administrative rate.  For example, using the cost driver expense model, 
one can see that at 3.0% there is a 20.4% chance that the FMS-AA in 2015 will be above 
$2 billion, but using 3.4%, that probability more than doubles to 44.3%.  Threshold 
values were picked by incrementing the 2010 FMS-AA level by $500 million. 
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Table 39.   Monte Carlo Sensitivity Analysis: Chances That the FMS-AA in 2015 Will 
Be Above a Threshold Value 
Expense Model: Cost Drivers
$(MIL) $2,000 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500
2.0% 0.01% 0.00% 0.0% 0.0%
2.5% 2.32% 0.06% 0.0% 0.0%
2.8% 10.60% 0.93% 0.0% 0.0%
3.0% 20.4% 3.2% 0.2% 0.0%
3.1% 26.2% 5.2% 0.4% 0.0%
3.2% 32.0% 7.5% 0.8% 0.0%
3.3% 38.4% 11.0% 1.5% 0.1%
3.4% 44.3% 14.5% 2.4% 0.2%
3.8% 65.2% 33.42% 11.0% 2.0%
4.0% 73.2% 44.34% 17.8% 4.4%
Expense Model: Flat
$(MIL) $2,000 $2,500 $3,000 $3,500
2.0% 0.55% 0.00% 0.0% 0.0%
2.5% 14.95% 1.14% 0.0% 0.0%
2.8% 34.82% 6.73% 0.5% 0.0%
3.0% 48.1% 14.1% 1.8% 0.1%
3.1% 55.0% 18.8% 3.0% 0.2%
3.2% 60.9% 24.3% 4.8% 0.4%
3.3% 65.9% 30.0% 7.2% 0.8%
3.4% 70.7% 36.2% 10.3% 1.5%
3.8% 84.6% 57.95% 26.8% 7.8%
4.0% 88.7% 67.31% 37.0% 13.2%  
 
High threshold sensitivity analysis demonstrates the differentiation in risk for the 
3.0–3.4% administrative surcharge range.  Using the flat expense model, at 3.0%, there is 
only a 1.8% chance that the FMS-AA will be above $3 billion in 2015, while at 3.4%, 
that risk is increased to 10.3%, which is roughly a five times increase in risk.  Since the 
DSCA finds it undesirable to have a FMS-AA that has a large balance, it is important to 
consider the risk of letting the FMS-AA go above threshold values. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Our study provides a financial analysis and assessment of the DSCA business 
operations by addressing the following research questions:  
(1) What is the DSCA’s general cost structure?  
(2) What are the relevant cost drivers for administering the FMS program?  
(3) Was the 2005 Fees Study Group analysis well founded? 
(4) What is the optimal administrative surcharge rate to ensure the long-term 
solvency of the FMS Trust Fund?  
1. Cost Structure 
The cost of administering the FMS program is predominantly due to personnel-
related and contractor costs. An analysis of the DSCA’s budget execution by object class 
from 2005 to 2010 revealed that over 90% of their costs are due to personnel labor costs 
and contractual services.  Less than 10% of the DSCA’s expenses were dedicated to all 
other expenses and overhead, to include rent, communication, utilities, travel, 
transportation, printing, supplies, and equipment.  Thus DSCA can be characterized as a 
labor intensive, rather than a capital intensive organization. 
From 2005 to 2010, DSCA also demonstrated rising trends in both contractor 
services and average cost of work years. Since 2005, contractor work years as a share of 
total work years have increased 125%.  With the growing contractor support, the average 
work year cost has increased 12.4%.  If these trends continue, these factors will 
compound the increase in total budget requirements. 
2. Relevant Cost Drivers 
Regression analysis consistently found the number of LORs completed during the 
FY (#LOR) to be the most significant cost driver for both the DSCA and the MILDEPs. 
The emergence of #LOR as the best explanatory variable for predicting workload and 
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budgets suggests that quantity drives workload more than dollar-values drive workload.  
While all our models demonstrate strong statistical significance, low p-values and high 
R-square values do not always lead to practical explanatory power.  The DSCA should 
consider the experienced input of IAs to ascertain additional factors and intangibles that 
may affect workload and resource requirements. It is also important to note that these 
budget forecasting models predict budgets based on past funding levels using budget 
execution data, and do not indicate what funding levels should be allocated based on 
actual costs.  
a. Budget Estimating Relationships 
Using parametric cost-estimating techniques and regression analysis, we 
formulated models that estimate workload and budget requirements. We developed three 
budget estimating models that predicted workloads and budgets for DSCA as a whole, 
and also at the MILDEP level.  Table 40 provides a model summary for our three 
accepted estimating relationships. 






















#LOR 0.914 0.905 16.62 96.04 0.00 4.53%
 
 
Both cost factor models tested the following six explanatory variables for 
statistical significance: #LOR, #LOA, #TOC, $Admin, $Sales, and $TOC.  Our model 
acceptance criteria was based on a 95% confidence level and R-square values greater 
than 0.80.  Additionally, we preferred models without multi-collinearity (correlation 
coefficient < 0.70) and with mean absolute percentage errors less than 5%.  
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 (1)  DSCA Work Years Model. Our first model uses the sum of 
civilian and contractor work years as the cost driver for estimating the DSCA’s annual 
operating budget. The sum of civilian and contractor work years explained 98.5% of the 
variability in the DSCA’s budget from 2005 to 2010 and estimated the actual budget with 
a MAPE of 1.57%. Our DSCA Work Years Model budget estimating relationship is 
shown in Equation 12. 
    
 (12) 
 (2)  DSCA Cost Factor Model.  Our second model uses the 
number of LORs completed during the FY (#LOR) as the cost driver for predicting 
civilian and contractor work year requirements.  #LOR explained 97.3% of the variability 
in civilian and contractor work years from 2005 to 2010 and estimated the sum of work 
years with a low MAPE of 1.36%. The work years estimating relationship for the DSCA 
Cost Factor Model is shown in Equation 13. 
 (13) 
 (3)  MILDEP Cost Factor Model.  Our third model uses the 
number of LORs completed during the FY (#LOR) as the cost driver for estimating the 
MILDEP funding levels.  #LOR explained 91.4% of the variability in the MILDEP 
funding levels from 2000 to 2010 and estimated the budget with a MAPE of 4.53%.  The 





b. Other Considerations 
In the absence of actual cost data, this study analyzed budget data to 
provide a better understanding of the DSCA’s cost structure and reveal notable trends in 
their business operations. While our models are based on historical funding levels, all 
three estimating relationships demonstrated high statistical significance (R-squares 
greater than 0.90) and may be useful to the DSCA to make future resourcing decisions. 
However, in the end, there is no definitive cost driver without actual cost data.   
Additionally, the DSCA should monitor the rising trend in the number of 
open cases.  In 2001, the #TOC exceeded the #LOR for the first time and will continue to 
surpass the #LOR each year.  The cumulative effect of #TOC compounds the workload 
requirements because case managers must administer new LORs and LOAs each year in 
addition to managing the growing number of open cases.  The continued accumulation of 
open cases will undoubtedly have implications for DSCA’s future workload and 
budgeting requirements. 
3. The DSCA’s 2005 Internal Study 
The DSCA’s 2005 internal study was well founded and used sound methodology 
in establishing the 3.8% administrative surcharge rate.  At the time, it was impossible for 
the DSCA to predict the significant increase in FMS from 2006 to 2010, which caused 
the FMS-AA to reach record levels.  For future assessments, we recommend that the 
DSCA normalize all historical FMS financial data, which allows for a more equitable 
comparison of financial data.  The greatest shortcoming of the study was perhaps their 
failure to address the rising trend of the trust fund balance using a 3.8% surcharge rate.  
While the study demonstrated that 3.8% would bring the FMS trust fund balance back 
into solvency, the forecasts also showed sustained growth in the trust fund balance that 
would continue beyond their required safety levels.  Finally, the years of the study from 
1995 to 2005 represented an uncharacteristic period of sustained low levels of FMS.  
Since the DSCA ensures the long-term solvency of the trust fund, future studies should 
consider the historic FMS average over a longer time series.   
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4. Administrative Surcharge Rate 
Based on our analysis, we recommend that the DSCA use 3.0% as its FMS 
administrative surcharge rate.  This thesis examined the FMS-AA by modeling historical 
data as well as forecasting the FMS-AA from 2011 to 2015.  While other possible 
solutions exist, this thesis research supports 3.0% as the best rate in the current 
environment.  Analysis of this research is summarized as follows. 
• From 1977 to 1988, the DSCA used 3.0% as their administrative 
surcharge rate with some success.  Average growth rate per year was 
28.2% for the ending balance of the FMS-AA.  It could be argued that 
because the DSCA changed the surcharge rate from 3.0% to 2.5% in 1999 
that the 3.0% rate was invalid.  This however was not the case, because 
invalid assumptions about future events dictated the 1999 rate change.  A 
1999 GAO report revealed the same conclusion in Defense Trade: 
Decision to Lower FMS Administrative Fee is Premature (GAO, 1999a). 
• Using the anticipated earnings model, a 3.0% administrative rate applied 
to 1999–2010 historical FMS data demonstrated a -3.3% average change 
per year in the FMS-AA ending balance from 1999 to 2005 and an 
average 7.6% per year growth from 1999 to 2010.  -3.3% is not a cause for 
concern because the average FMS from 1999 to 2005 was $16.3 billion, 
which is below the historical average of $26 billion FMS.  If FMS 
continues with the present high rate of growth, 3.0% mitigates the 
excessive gain in the FMS-AA. 
• Using Monte Carlo forecasting models, which provide probability 
distributions for possible outcomes, we simulated FMS from 2011 to 
2015. An applied 3.0% administrative rate using the cost driver expense 
model demonstrated the FMS-AA decreasing at an average of 6.3% a 
year, while the same scenario using a flat expense model demonstrated the 
FMS-AA decreasing only 0.5% per year. 
• Both the aggressive FMS growth and reduced FMS models have a less 
than 15% chance of occurring assuming FMS is normally distributed.  In 
both cases, a 3.0% administrative rate would still work, albeit not optimal.  
In the aggressive FMS model, a 3.0% rate would grow the FMS-AA in 
2015 to $4.8 billion, while in the reduced FMS sales model, the FMS-AA 
would decrease to $1 billion.  In both of these cases, different 
administrative rates would produce more optimal results for the FMS-AA; 
however, since the DSCA’s objective is to minimize the changes in 




• While 3.0% is a solid recommendation, a case could be made for choosing 
a rate within the range of 3.0% to 3.4% using the same arguments 
mentioned previously.  The most optimal solution within this range is 
3.0% because it mitigates the risk of the FMS-AA getting too large.  All 
rates in the 3.0% to 3.4% range using sensitivity analysis demonstrate less 
than 6% probability of the FMS-AA getting below pre-determined safety 
levels by 2015.  However, 3.0% does the best job of mitigating the risk of 
the FMS-AA getting too large if increased FMS continue.  If FMS 
stabilize at the highest probability FMS levels from our Monte Carlo 
model at roughly $25.5 billion, 3.0% minimizes the fluctuations in the 
FMS-AA compared to any other rate. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
This section recommends areas of research for further study and evaluation. As 
we conducted our analysis, we identified the following areas for future research efforts. 
• Collections Curve Smoothing. This research is based on the notion that 
“smoothing” out the collections curve could possibly bring more stability 
to the FMS-AA.  For most FMS cases, the DSCA collects 50% of the 
surcharge up front in the first year.  The question arises on whether there 
is a matching problem with revenues and expenses.  In other words, is 
50% of the workload conducted in the first year?  Future research could 
evaluate this current policy and examine alternative collection schedules.  
For example, collecting 30% the first year and 20% the second year.  A 
flatter collections curve may reduce the risk of the Administrative Trust 
Fund dropping below acceptable levels during a single low sales year. 
This research would test the hypothesis that a smoother collections curve 
would result in more stability to the FMS-AA. 
• Tiered Pricing Structure. The DSCA recently implemented a tiered pricing 
structure for FMS cases that exceeds $9 billion.  Above $9 billion, the 
DSCA would discount the administrative surcharge rate by 1%.  This 
thesis did not address the effects of this new tiered pricing policy.  This 
policy would help mitigate the excess funds collected on the highest 
dollar-value cases. Future research would address the effect of this policy 
on future revenues and potentially expand on the applicability of a more 
comprehensive tiered pricing structure.   
• Lagging Effect. Historical data indicates a two-year lag between increased 
sales and increased budgets. The lagging effect accounts for the time 
required to implement policies and adjust to changing workload 
requirements. For example, how long does it take the DSCA to add 
required work years in response to increased workload? Future research 
could offset relevant data by one or two years and re-evaluate for 
significant cost factors.  Additionally, the use of contractors may provide 
less lag. 
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• Number of Cases Closed Each Year.  This is another cost factor to 
consider in future research since closing cases also requires certain levels 
of workload.  The DSCA recognizes the importance of reconciliation and 
case closure. GAO reports indicate that inadequate administrative funding 
results in the inability of MILDEPs to close cases in a timely manner and 
that “slow case closures have been the subject of FMS customer 
complaints” (GAO, 1999b, p. 9-10). Case closure data will also allow 
comparisons between the rates of new case implementation versus the 
rates of case closure and help identify trends in the growing number of 
open cases.    
• Service-Specific Models.  This research would examine the cost structure 
and budget estimating models at the three main Service levels—Army, 
Navy, and Air Force.  By collecting historical data from each specific IA, 
this research could identify cost drivers unique to each military department 
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